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Abstract
This thesis develops a model of structural power in society that builds upon
Weber’s notion that several types of power exist in societies and that these types of
power operate differently within societies. The purpose of this model is to help explain
the political economy of development during Museveni’s tenure. The thesis argues that
Museveni has centralized power through a complex system of patronage and repression.
Furthermore, Museveni’s transformation from the leader of a cadre of ‘new breed
leaders’ to ‘just another African big man’ results from his choice to centralize power as a
means of achieving his revolutionary goals. While this thesis explains how this
centralization occurred it does not explain why. The final chapter investigates some
theoretical frameworks to explain why it has occurred. The thesis concludes by noting
that a combination of these frameworks and the model developed herein offer several
avenues for possible further research.
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INTRODUCTION
The early 1990’s saw the emergence of a “new breed” of African leader. The
original triumvirate of Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia, Isaias Afewrki of Eritrea and Yoweri
Museveni of Uganda became internationally recognized as the scions of this new breed.
Their embrace of Western political and economic values seemed, especially to leaders in
Western donor nations, as a watershed for African politics. Gone were the days of
Mobuto Sese Seko’s venal regime, gone were the days of Julius Nyerere and Jomo
Kenyatta’s pan-Africanist movement. This new triumvirate would herald in the
modernization of Africa. Among this new ruling class none were as magnanimous or
successful as Yoweri Museveni.
New York Times journalist James McKinley, Jr. characterized international
sentiments towards Museveni with this 1997 entry:
These are heady days for the former guerrilla who runs Uganda. He moves with
the measured gait and sure gestures of a leader secure in his power and in his
vision.These days, political pundits across the continent are calling Mr. Museveni
an African Bismarck. Some people now refer to him as Africa's ''other statesman,''
second only to the venerated South African President, Nelson Mandela.1
McKinley is by no means measured in his adulation of Museveni. The same could be said
of many the other new generation of leaders. Much political rhetoric was devoted, both
within African and from without, to the political transformation of Africa. In the space of
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James C. McKinley Jr., “Uganda Leader Stands Tall in New African Order,” New York Times June 15,
1997 at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/15/world/uganda-leader-stands-tall-in-new-african-order.html
(accessed on 29 September 2011).

1

ten short years Museveni had gone from virtually unknown African rebel leader from the
bush of Uganda, to the patriarch of African politics. Two policy developments in
Museveni’s first ten years illustrate why the West attached itself to Museveni. First,
Museveni’s rhetoric aligned his goals with Western ideals for Africa. Second, at a time
when many African leaders skirted the growing issue of the AIDS pandemic Museveni
confronted the disease. This confrontation of traditional taboo subjects demonstrated
Museveni’s modernizing credentials and his ability to confront traditional notions of
health and development.
Museveni’s Acceptance of Western Ideals
One of Museveni’s qualities that most endeared him to Western nations was his
acceptance of Western political and economic ideas and behaviors. Politically, Museveni
was often heard excoriating previous African leaders for their extended tenures in office.
On one occasion Museveni argued that Africa’s problem derived from leaders staying in
office too long.2 This seemingly dramatic shift in African political rhetoric caught the
attention of Western governments. In addition to his calls for shorter terms for African
leaders Museveni’s system of and calls for increased decentralization of power further
enshrined him as the scion of the new breed of African leaders. These new African
political ideas also blended well with Museveni’s adherence to Western economic
policies, particularly his embrace of neoliberalism, as Museveni moved to increase
privatization levels3 and decrease overall government spending4. This adoption of such
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Will Ross, “Would Uganda’s Museveni Recognize His Former Self,” BBC News, 7 May 2011 at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/9477930.stm.
3
Roger Tangri and Andrew Mwenda, “Corruption and Cronyism in Uganda’s Privatization in the 1990’s,”
African Affairs (2001): 117.
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strict neoliberal policies in the heart of Africa opened the way for Western leaders to
easily attach themselves to Museveni and his new government.
Confronting the Reality of AIDS
The second action taken by the government illustrates Museveni’s willingness to
confront traditional notions of health and development. In 1986 the government of
Uganda began confronting the challenge of HIV/AIDS. They instituted the ABC program
(Abstinence, Be faithful, Condoms). In 1990 the HIV/AIDS infection rate in Uganda was
roughly 15% of the total population.5Currently, the HIV/AIDS rate in Uganda has
plummeted to nearly 5%.6 This program was effective due to its direct confrontation of
the issue. This direct confrontation can be attributable to Museveni’s willingness to act.
In this context Museveni came to be seen as an African modernizer, one who was willing
and able to confront the reality of challenges facing African states. This program has
served as model for many developing nations to confront the HIV/AIDS pandemic.
Declining Favorability
Despite the aforementioned accomplishments in his first ten years in office,
Museveni soon began to lose favor with the West. In the space of roughly ten years the
Museveni led triumvirate of new African leaders have all but fallen out of favor with
Western governments. American ambassador Jerry Lanier’s statement in a diplomatic
cable epitomizes this declining favorability: “The President’s autocratic tendencies, as
well as Uganda’s pervasive corruption, sharpening ethnic divisions and explosive
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The foundation ideas for decentralized government are outlined by Museveni in his book What is Africa’s
Problem? (University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, MN, 2000).
5
UNAIDS/WHO, Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV and AIDS: Uganda, (UNAIDS/WHO: Geneva,
2008), 4.
6
Ibid.
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population growth, have eroding [sic] Uganda’s status as an African success story.”7No
longer are Museveni and the others eulogized as African modernizers, but are decried as
African big men. How did Museveni go from the paragon of African political virtue to
the epitome of African political dysfunction in such a short time-span?
I argue in this thesis the Museveni’s transformation was, and is, a direct result of
the length, nature, and consequences of his tenure in office. This extended tenure has
been a direct result of his ability to maintain power in Uganda’s fractious society. While
Museveni may have rhetorically accepted Western political ideals, he has governed
according to the underlying political realities of Ugandan society. These realities derive
from the ethnically divided nature of contemporary Ugandan society. In order to
accomplish his desired goals and vision for his tenure Museveni choose to govern
through informal, personal channels as opposed to formal, institutional channels. While
on the surface Museveni has appeared to be building formal institutional structures that
would allow greater influence for the rule of law, he was not. These efforts were merely a
façade to cover his network of informal institutions. This thesis will demonstrate how this
has occurred during his presidential tenure and will do so according to the following
outline.
In chapter 1 a model is developed that explains how the structure of power in
Uganda’s society has shifted during Museveni’s presidential tenure. This model is first
outlined conceptually and then applied to contemporary Ugandan society. This chapter
argues that political authorities in Ugandan society have centralized power at the expense
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Emmanuel Gyezaho, “Wikileaks: Museveni Rule Eroding Uganda’s Success,” Africa Review,
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of social identities and cultural elements in society. This centralization underscores
Museveni’s influence on contemporary Ugandan society. However, this model does not
explain the political logic of Museveni’s actions. This is a shortcoming of the model that
is further addressed in the final chapter. Despite this shortcoming the model developed
nonetheless does explain the broader societal power dynamics of Museveni’s presidential
tenure and for this reason the model was developed and employed.
Next, chapter 2 deepens the understanding of how Museveni centralized societal
power. In this chapter I argue that a logical system of patronage and repression allowed
Museveni to entrench and expand his power throughout Uganda’s ethnically divided
society. The central observation is that Museveni has pursued different patronage
strategies in both northern and southern Uganda, but has equally repressed both halves of
the country. This chapter focuses on outlining the nature of the systems, while leaving the
description of the political logic to the concluding chapter.
After reviewing the nature of Museveni’s structure of power maintenance chapter
3 analyzes the positive and negative consequences of Museveni’s extended presidential
tenure. The positive consequences are derivatives of the political and economic stability
Museveni brought to Uganda. However, in many ways these positive developments
represent the same political logic exhibited in Museveni’s patronage system. The
negative consequences also exhibit a political logic but one that differs from the
distribution of patronage and positive consequences. Like the motives of the patronage
system, this political logic is synthesized in the concluding chapter.
The 4 and concluding chapter will attempt to synthesize chapters 1-3 by
describing the political logic of Museveni’s centralization of power. This political logic
5

sheds light on Museveni’s declining favorability. This logic illustrates that Museveni
governed Uganda according to the underlying political realities of Ugandan society,
namely the ethnically fractious nature of society. Had he not governed in such a way he
would have never centralized and maintained power for the past thirty years. His choice
to govern in this manner has led to his declining favorability in Western circles as many
leaders have come to view him as not part of a new cadre of African leaders.
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CHAPTER ONE: CONSTRUCTING SOCIETAL POWER STRUCTURES
Societies are constructed according to those elements within the society that
possess the greatest amount of power within the society. As defined in this thesis
societies are comprised of four elements: 1) political 2) economic, 3) social identities,
and 4) cultural. Each of these elements holds a unique place and function in a particular
society. The main goal of each element of society is to secure for itself benefits via the
acquisition of power. The figure below provides a visual model of what how elements
relate to one another within a conceptualized society.
Figure 1. Relationship Between Societal Elements in Conceptualized Society.8
Political

Social Identities

Cultural

Economic
What the model represents is the relationship between the political and economic
elements in society and the social identities and their relationship to the cultural elements
of society. The positioning of the elements within the model represent the position they
play in society. Central to any society are the political and economic elements. Operating
8

This model is adapted from a discussion the author had with Paul Viotti concerning the work of David
Easton. For further detail concerning this work please see David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political
Life (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1965).
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within those elements, and contributing to those elements, are the social identities of the
society and the cultural practices/norms of the society. Lastly, the model illustrates that
each element of society has a vested interest in maintaining proper power balances within
the society.
The self-interested pursuit of the acquisition of power shapes a society.
Furthermore, the interactions between each element of society allow for a proper balance
of power to be achieved and, theory a productive society to be shaped. Max Weber’s
definition of power, “the chances [sic] which a man or a group of men have to realize
their will in a communal activity, even against the opposition of others taking part in
it,”9is a useful foundation from which to analyze these power acquisition interactions. As
societal elements interact they begin to develop an intersubjective understanding of the
others and the other’s place in the society. In this process some elements become
relatively more powerful than the others in society. In the ideal society this process
gradually leads to a set of productive relationships through processes of ‘give and take’
consensus building that allows mutual benefit to all elements of society.
However, in reality what takes place is much different. The distribution of power
throughout the elements of society become unequal and therefore affects the functioning
of the societal system as a whole. Each element of society seeks to acquire power in order
to realize their will at the expense of others within the system. This acquisition of power,
and the subsequent distribution of power across the system, results in four main types of
power: political, economic, citizen, and cultural. In essence each element seeks to push

9

Max Weber, “The Distribution of Power in Society: Classes, Status Groups and Parties,” in Sam
Whimster, The Essential Weber (New York: Routledge, 2004), 183.
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itself into the prominent position within the system and therefore secure for itself, and its
members, the privileges of systemic rule.10 This broad definition of power presented
above is central to the purposes of this thesis as the idea of the individual or group is
directly transferable to the concept of societal elements as presented here. These four
types of power are different11 and with each exhibiting different characteristics upon the
system and leading to the development of different types of societies.
These developments in societies are dynamic and can shift over time due to
different types of interactions between the different elements of society. In essence
societies can be reshaped due to the emergence of another type of power that successfully
supplants the dominant power holders and successfully restructures power in their favor.
The French Revolution is an example of such an event occurring. During the Revolution
political authorities maintained both political and economic power over social identities
for centuries until the emergent strength of social identities overtook the systemic power
of political authorities. Social identities used their own power to acquire economic power
and completely reshaped society. The societal dynamism exemplified in the French
Revolution is characteristic of systems focused on power acquisition. In order to
understand the role of power in shaping societal constructions and identity it is important
to examine more closely the four types of power outlined above.
Types of Power
As mentioned above four types of power exist within societies. Each element
within society acquires power by it own mechanisms and processes. These different
10

This helps to explain why so many political authorities to come to acquire systemic power: they start at
the preeminent position within the system.
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Weber, 182.
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mechanisms cause each type of power to exhibit different characteristics in the societal
system. It is important to note that power is never distributed evenly across the entire
system, but rather it is unevenly distributed as shaped by the interactions between the
elements of society and the actions of individuals most in control of those elements. The
distribution of this power is what eventually determines how the society is constructed
and what identity the society takes on.
Political Power
Political power is the most important form of power across any societal system. A
simple definition of this type of power is the ability to enact, influence, or create codified
law within a society. Often it forms the basis of the systemic law and order. A societal
system cannot exist without political power. Regardless of the evolutionary position of
the society (i.e. modern state, a nation, a tribal society) all societies, with the exception of
hypothetical anarchies, must have authorities who determine laws and who enforce such
laws. These authorities make up the political elements of society and wield political
power within it. Both political authorities and political power exist in a symbiotic
relationship that reinforces the preeminent position of the political elements within the
societal system. Lastly, it is important to note that political authorities are initially created
by the acquisition of political power; however, once created political authorities control
political power, it creation and destruction. Both of these concepts are central to the
acquisition of political power within societies. Examining how political authorities are
created by political power and how they then come to control this power will illustrate
this process of power acquisition.
10

Political authorities are created by political power. The initial origin of this
political power differs from society to society. Whether by inheritance, bestowal, the
transfer of power via democracy, or through brute force all political authorities must
become authorities through their acquisition of political power. Societies can experience
a single acquisition of political power (as in the case of the United States social identities
transferring power to representatives) or multiple transfers of power (as in the case of
Haiti and its multiplicity of coups) over time, but rarely experience complete upheavals
such as those witnessed in the French Revolution. Specifically in the African context,
societies across the continent have consistently seen multiple transfers of power, often
vacillating from the hands of social identities to those of political authorities. The
frequency and type of transfer of political power has lasting effects on the overall society.
Once transferred, regardless of how this initial political power is transferred, those who
hold it, for better or worse, control the power.
Political authorities control political power as thy enact laws or other forms of
institutions in regards to their status as the creators and enforcers of law. These laws or
institutions can reinforce, strengthen, or destroy this position, and thus have a causal
effect on political power. The enacting of laws to be enforced upon the other elements of
society by political authorities weakens the other elements power position within the
system; they are at the whim of the political authorities. The opposite is also true: the
destruction of political power strengthens other elements of society. If left unchecked by
the society, political authorities have the ability to create enough political power to
overwhelm the entire system, or in other words acquire systemic power. This creation of
11

systemic rule by political power is ultimately destructive of the entire society, but
beneficial to the political authorities. Adequate economic and citizen power can check the
runaway growth of political power.
Economic Power
Much like political power economic power is vital for a society to successfully
exist. However unlike political power that can be acquired through on interaction,
economic power is acquired through multiple interactions between multiple elements
over time. Furthermore, economic power is not controlled in the same manner that
political power is controlled: economic power exists independent of those who hold it
and is highly transferable. Those who hold economic power can wield considerable
power within the system. However, their wielding of power does not necessarily result in
destructive consequences in the same way systemic political power does. Lastly,
economic power can be held by all in society and is not restricted solely to one class of
people as is political power.
As argued above economic power is acquired though multiple interactions with
multiple societal elements over time. The result of these interactions is the acquisition of
wealth, either in monetary form or other forms such as land. Economic power derives
from this wealth. As more and more individuals within the economic sphere acquire more
wealth more economic power is generated. However, because of this power is highly
transferable it is not as easily controlled as political power.
Despite its difficulty to control, the wielding of economic power can hold
considerable sway over the societal system towards both positive and negative ends.
12

Positive benefits come when economic power is widely disbursed throughout society in
the hands of large number of individuals. As larger numbers of individuals acquire
economic power they now have agency in their lives thus empowering individuals to act
for themselves and not to be acted upon by other element or actors in society. Most
importantly the more disbursed economic power is away from political authorities the
more productive the societal system can become. When economic power is outside the
hands of political authorities individuals acting within the economy begin to gain power
within the system and can counterbalance any attempts to grow political power.They can
push back against political authorities when political authorities begin to encroach on
their ability to gain wealth. However, when the acquisition of economic power is not
regulated to the benefit of the system economic power becomes centralized in the hands
of a few. This centralization creates negative consequences for the system.
The negative consequences associated with the centralization of economic power
center on the loss of economic actors in society to act as a check on runaway political
power. The centralization of economic power can take place in two ways. First, the most
economically successful individuals can gradually acquire the majority of the economic
power in the system through their own talent and success. This happens when few
restraints are placed upon economic interactions over time. Second, economic power can
be centralized as political authorities acquire economic power due to their political
positions or through the co-optation of those holding the majority of economic power.
Both types of economic centralization have negative, but different, systemic
consequences. In the first instance the centralization makes it easier for economic power
13

holders to cooperate with political authorities. Thus rather than acting as a counterbalance
on growing political power those holding economic power can align their actions with
those of political authorities in order to secure their interests, namely the complete
maximization of profits and market position. Cooperative relationships such as these do
little to create the conditions for greater distribution of economic power and the
subsequent long term society construction becomes unstable.
In the second scenario when economic power becomes centralized under political
authorities the society as a whole begins to break down. The acquisition of economic
power by political authorities often occurs through nefarious means. The use of political
position to secure government contracts or market positions undermines economic
competitiveness and ultimately leads to a loss in overall productivity. Furthermore, if
political authorities do acquire large amounts of economic power prior to acquiring
political power they often use this political power to acquire more economic power thus
having the same affects as in the first scenario.
The proper distribution of economic power is thus critical to maintaining a
productive society. Proper distribution can act as a check on runaway political power.
Conversely the centralization of economic power can actually serve to undermine
competitiveness and in some ways serve to facilitate runaway political power. In order to
ensure that the proper distribution of economic power occurs social identities must hold
enough power within society in order to properly monitor political power and economic
centralization.

14

Power of Social Identities
The power of social identities derives from the ability of individuals to organize
in favor or against a cause, government action, or any other idea around which they feel
to organize. This organization can take various forms and is not constrained to mere
protests or opposition political movements. It is not only the nominal ability to organize
that facilitates the acquisition of power but also the proven ability to do so. The
intersubjective interaction between social identities and other societal actors, mainly
political authorities, shapes their nominal and real ability to organize. These abilities are
mainly shaped through the interactions with the political elements. Political authorities
can quickly curtail or enhance this ability through legislative or arbitrary action.
Therefore it is imperative that social identities and political authorities act cooperatively
to shape the norms of citizen organization, as it is the mechanism for power acquisition.
When large enough these social identities can acquire systemic power and
overwhelm the other societal elements. It is also important to note than an individual
cannot possess citizen power as it derives from group organization. Furthermore, the
likelihood of the centralization of citizen power is very low as its very nature precludes
multiple groups with diverse interests from coming together under one leadership
umbrella. Precisely for these reasons citizen power is unlike political and economic
power in that the accumulation of citizen power has very little if any negative
consequences for the system. On the contrary large social identities are highly often be
beneficial to the system, as groups are more capable of producing positive results from

15

collective actions than are individuals.12 Therefore with organization comes power within
the societal system. This power leads to at least positive outcomes for the society.
First, the diffuse nature of social identities allows them easily act as a type of
organic oversight committee against unbridled economic centralization. Multiple interests
exist within a society and these interests, if allowed to organize and acquire citizen
power, are likely to seek out likeminded economic power holders in order to cooperate
with them. Conversely, these interests are also likely to investigate economic power
holders in order to expose their attempts at centralization or other nefarious practices. In
both scenarios social identities and groups contribute to the continued diffusion of
economic power: when cooperation takes place power is diffused and when activities are
exposed economic power holders are often forced to concede certain levels power. They
therefore help to create stability within the system, thus promoting a productive society.
Second, the diffuse nature of social identities checks runaway growth in political
power. Simply put when social identities feel their societal rights or liberties are being
overwhelmed by encroaching political power they are able to organize against such
actions. Social identities can quickly organize to acquire systemic power and overwhelm
the political elements within the society. These social identities, often powerfully
motivated by a collective cause, can reach tipping points from which they shape, or
reshape, the distribution of power within the society in their favor if the right
combination of authorities is involved.13 However, despite the ability to reach systemic
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David Brooks, The Social Animal: The Hidden Sources of Love, Character, and Achievement, (New
York: Random House, 2011): 260.
13
Malcolm Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, (New York:
Little, Brown and Company, 2002), 33.
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power fairly quickly and organically these groups often become disjointed quickly after
achieving their objectives. Despite this lack of longevity these groups often leave behind
powerful forms of social capital from which reorganization is usually possible.
Thus the power of social identities is interconnected with economic and political
power within the societal system. When a society is constructing itself productively each
of these three elements serves to reinforce the productivity of the other. Economic power
acts as a check on political power, social indefinites act as a check on the centralization
of economic power and the runaway growth of political power, while political power can
check, albeit in a negative way, the growth of social identities. Figure 2 illustrates how
these three types of power interact with one another in an idealized, productive society as
described in the previous paragraph.
Figure 2. Power Relationships in an Ideal Society
Political

Economic

Social Identities
Cultural Power

Cultural power derives from the ability to shape societal norms and behaviors.
This power is often acquired and wielded by more traditional elements within the society
(e.g. kings, tribal elders, churches), but is not restricted to these individuals or groups. It
is possible that this power can be co-opted by the other three elements of society.
Furthermore cultural power is not exclusive: multiple actors within the system can hold
17

this power. Thus cultural power is more diffuse throughout the system than the other
types of societal power and is therefore more difficult to pinpoint its effects on the
system. That said cultural power holds great power over the entire system. As can be seen
in Figure 3 cultural power, in an ideal society, encapsulates the other power triangle
relationship of the other three forms of societal power. This encapsulation is meant to
represent the overarching nature of cultural power within the system. Furthermore, it
represents the ideal that cultural power is shared among multiple actors across multiple
elements of society. When cultural power is shared across multiple actors and multiple
elements the system can function more productively as only one group does not shape the
norms of various interactions.
Figure 3. Influence of Cultural Power on Systemic Power Relationships

Political
Cultural
Power
Economic

Social Identities

The ability to shape cultural norms and behaviors allows those possessing this
power to establish behavioral norms for societies. This shaping of cultural norms is not a
short-term proposition. Rather the shaping, or reshaping, of the cultural norms of
interaction takes place over generations. It is this long-term nature of this process that
gives cultural power such inertia this inertia is the reason traditional institutions often
18

hold the greatest concentrations, but not all, cultural power. With this power traditional
institutions can either condemn or encourage the development of negative societal
consequences. For example, in the case of the centralization of economic power a
traditional institution can come out against the centralization of power on the basis of its
going against traditional economic practices, or it can encourage this practice by arguing
the opposite.
For a society to be productive cultural power must be used to shape norms in such
a way that averts the negative consequences of systemic power acquisition. In an ideal
positively functioning society cultural power is wielded in differing ways across the other
elements of society. Traditional institutions can be, and often are, overruled by other
societal elements, namely the political and economic, wielding cultural power. When this
power becomes monopolized by one element of society it aids those societal actors in the
acquisition of systemic power. This monopolization begins a dysfunctional set of
processes that leads to an unproductive society.
In the scenarios where traditional institutions are no longer the dominant wielders
of cultural power, cultural norms are reshaped in systemically unbeneficial ways.
Cultural norms can become co-opted by political and economic actors and reshaped in
ways that benefit these elements in their pursuit of systemic power acquisition. Figures 3
and 4 illustrate how the model shifts when cultural power is monopolized by either
political or economic elements within society. The negative consequences of political
authorities wielding systemic power and economic centralization are outlined previously.
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But the important question remains: how does cultural power become centralized in nontraditional institutions and elements?
Figure 3. Cultural Power Monopolized by Political Authorities

Political

Economic

Social Identities

Figure 4. Cultural Power Monopolized by Economic Authorities
Political

Economic

Social Identities

Political authorities monopolize cultural power using force or cooptation. Force is
often used to eliminate traditional authorities for the societal system. This elimination
does not singularly constitute murder or other forms of physical violence, but can also
include arrest and exile. Political authorities can also use the force of state capability to
overwhelm the influence of traditional authorities. Political authorities engage in high
numbers of interactions in ways that reshapes cultural norms in their favor. These
interactions often involve political authorities engaging with social identities and the
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economy in ways counter to how traditional leaders would interact. In this manner the
ability to shape norms become that of the state and not traditional authorities simply
based on the number of interactions the state engages in with other elements of society.
Simply put, the state becomes more prominent in determining the rules of interaction
within the society than the traditional authorities. This pattern of power acquisition is
similar to the cooptation processes economic authorities use in their acquisition of
cultural power.
Economic actors regularly engage in dramatically higher number of interactions
over a given period of time than other elements of society. It therefore follows that any
attempt to reshape cultural norms in their favor could easily take place. Unlike political
authorities, economic authorities merely seek to gradually reshape cultural norms through
leveraging them towards the greater generation of wealth. Whereas political authorities
can often seek to reshape cultural norms by erasing them and starting over, economic
authorities seek to reshape them by interacting within them over time in their favor. Thus
by interacting within these norms and making minor readjustments to them to fit them
into their business interactions economic actors gradually co-opt cultural power and
reshape societal norms.
The question then arises concerning what effects these four types of power and
the acquisition processes of each have on the societal construction and identity. As one
might predict their effects differ, but they differ in the presence of different types and
levels power found within the system. It is therefore not possible to discuss the effects of
an individual power type in isolation. The challenge then becomes how can one identify
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the presence of varying levels of a particular type of power within a system? Analyzing
the societal construction and identity yields understanding as to which elements and types
of power are most prominent in society.
Each society is uniquely its own and as such must be analyzed within its historical
context. One must discover the broad historical narratives of the society in order to fully
understand and analyze its power interactions of the society. For this thesis the process of
discovering the board historical narratives is difficult as pre-colonial Uganda experienced
nearly 1000 years of various forms of societal interactions and little academic work has
been done on those interactions. Nonetheless adequate work on the colonial and postcolonial Ugandan society has been done and the reader is encouraged to seek these
sources out from the reference list if more information is desired. The following section
will attempt to sketch how Ugandan society is constructed to determine which forms of
power are dominant within the system. Given the focus on the present some references
will be given from earlier works on pre-colonial and colonial Ugandan society where
relevant.
Ugandan Society under Museveni
The purpose of this section is to analyze the state of Ugandan society during the
Museveni era through the previously outlined model of societal power. In laying out the
various types of power the purpose was to conceptually understand their sources and how
they interact within a conceptual society. As the remainder of the chapter proceeds keep
in mind that societies are not static and are products the broad historical trends of their
construction. Uganda is no different.
22

Political Power in Uganda
Political power in Uganda is centered squarely in the hands President Museveni.
He has acquired this power at a steadily increasing rate over his nearly 30 years in power.
What started as a popular ousting of the second Milton Obote government in favor of a
more open, democratic and forward-looking government has in many ways become what
it sought to replace. Museveni’s first ten years in office were non-democratic with
himself as the ultimate voice of government, thus allowing him to acquire political power
by decree. Furthermore, Museveni’s growing ability to influence parliament towards
supporting his own agenda give him remarkable political power.14
Museveni’s rise to power following the ousting of the unpopular Obote
government, and his subsequent national vision, established his popularity within society.
As recipients of this vast support and popular legitimacy, the government promised the
restoration of democracy and constitutionalism. Thus, outlining their revolutionary aims
of reconstructing power along democratic ideals. Sensing their own popular legitimacy
political authorities postponed the beginning of these aims for ten years until 1995-96.
While the reasons may not be wholly nefarious, one cannot help but to question why the
regime waited for ten years to restore democracy. Regardless of the reason for delaying
these processes, the Museveni government and the ruling party established itself as the
dominant political entity over those ten years.
Since the first elections held in 1996 and the restoration of nominal multipartyism
has continued acquire political power based upon the groundwork it laid during its first
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ten years in office. As will be explored in a later chapter the regime has created multiple
avenues to generate loyalty and support throughout the country. Furthermore, its
background as an insurgent group has given rise to its repressive naturein its efforts at
maintaining political. Thus, Museveni’s first ten years in office were the platform from
which he acquired and then expanded his political power. Currently, Museveni’s political
power is largely un-challenged, but cracks (rather large ones) are beginning to develop
within his government.15
Economic Power in Uganda
The economic actors within Ugandan society are fairly independent of the
government and have avoided the economic centralization that has taken place in many
other one-party African states. The lists of the Ugandan rich and super rich demonstrate
the diffusion of wealth throughout different sectors in Uganda. This diverse group of selfmade businessmen, large landholders, and a few government department executives
should hardly be considered as a cadre of ruling party faithful or solely pursuing ruling
party interests.16 This diffusion of economic power away from political authorities has
always been a hallmark of Ugandan society and is one of the driving forces behind its
resilience.
This diffusion of economic power outside the hands of political authorities has
often caused severe tensions to develop between the political authorities and economic
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actors. At one point even Idi Amin expelled all “Asians” from the country in 1972 and
took control of the economy in an effort to centralize economic power in political
authorities. This centralization devastated the economy in multiple ways. Aside from this
brief episode of Africanization and nationalization during the Amin years, the distribution
of wealth has not changed significantly since independence; however, under Museveni
the process by which wealth, and subsequently economic power, is acquired has.
Since 1986 Uganda has undergone a significant economic liberalization program.
The Museveni government has implemented and continues to implement neoliberal
reforms in Uganda.17 Its adoption is tied to its relationship with the World Bank, which
has been one of the largest institutional promoters of neoliberalism.18 The irony of
Uganda’s adoption of neoliberalism is that this adoption process has been state guided
and state owned.19 Political authorities have sought to oversee the implementation of the
neo-liberal agenda and have created and odd mixture of surprisingly successful state-led
neoliberal policies. However, political authorities did not merely view neoliberalism as a
mechanism to spur growth and development, but also as a mechanism to acquire further
economic power.
Neoliberalism, like most aspects of the Museveni government, has been co-opted
in Museveni’s continuing attempt to personalize the state. While the reforms appear to
have contributed to a decade and a half of economic growth, they have also enlarged the
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capabilities of political authorities operating within the economy.20 The reach of the
regime has been widened in two ways and this widening has increased the amount of
economic power within the NRM. First, economic growth has increased the amount of
money flowing into the government in the form of taxes and other forms of donor support
and there is therefore more resources to distribute as patronage. Second, the economic
growth that has taken place during the Museveni era has brought the government greater
legitimacy in the southern ethnic Bantu portions of the country where much of this
growth has occurred. While the south has seen great economic progress, the north has
only seen stagnation and deprivation. The horizontal inequalities have contributed to
many of the ethnic tensions during the Museveni’s tenure.
Despite the enlarged capabilities of political authorities operating within the
economy, economic power continues to be diffused throughout society. Non-ruling party
actors holding economic power pursue their own interests and thus possess the ability to
act as a check against any attempts by political authorities to acquire too much economic
power. While this statement is true for the society as a whole, it is more difficult for those
from the northern regions to check growing political power. The economic stagnation of
northern Ugandan during Museveni’s tenure is thus allowing the ruling party to begin to
acquire larger amounts of economic power in the north.
Economic power in Uganda is structured differently in the northern and southern
halves of the country. In the south economic power is widely diffused away from the
ruling party and those holding this power possess the ability to check the growing
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political power of the Musevni government. In the north economic stagnation depleted
any transformative economic capabilities and this lack of transformative economic
capabilities forces the north to seek government assistance in generating economic
development.21 From this assistance the Museveni government is slowly centralizing its
economic power in the north.
The Power of Social Identities in Uganda
Despite the nominally democratic nature of the Ugandan system social identities’
hold relatively little power within society. Museveni and other political authorities hold
large amounts of political power, which they use to overwhelm and suppress the power of
social identities. Under this construction social identities find it difficult to create
effective interest organizations opposed to regime interests. The nature of Uganda’s
constitution is such that citizen are afforded the right to peacefully assemble and
organize22; however, the effectiveness of opposition organizations is lacking. Groups that
are effective at pursuing their interests are those whose interests are aligned with the
regime. This cooptation stifles many attempts to effectively check the runaway growth of
political power of the Museveni government.
Two areas of potential power reflect this trend: opposition protests and the press.
First, as discussed in more detail in chapter three opposition protests are often repressed
both institutionally through the codification of law and violently through physical
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violence. Both types of repression have rarely hindered the actual gathering of protest
groups that seek to check political power or influence the direction of government, but
rather the organizations have had little influence over the actual course of government
decisions. The most recent walk to work protests did little to change the actual course of
policy and in many ways served to reinforce the ability to the central government to
dominate the societal system.
Second, and perhaps more importantly than the lack of effective opposition
groups, is the lack of a state run press. The New Vision group is notorious for its support
from and backing of the Museveni regime.23 In Uganda there are several African
language papers and are two main English language dailies. One of the most
disconcerting aspects of Uganda’s media culture is the dominance of the New Vision
Media group. Of the four major African language papers the New Vision group owns all
of them. Thus, government interests are easily disseminated throughout the country via
the New Vision apparatus. The ability of the government to reach into the ethnic majority
areas gives political authorities the advantage when it comes to shaping political
discourse. Shaping political discourse in favor of the government in ethnically unfriendly
regions allows the government to potentially win support from this coverage. Thus, even
in matters of the press the Museveni government attempts to extend its reach via ethnic
mechanisms.
The English language media market also experiences the same dynamics of
government influence. The two main English-language dailies are published by the New
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Vision group, which publishes New Vision and the Monitor group, which publishes Daily
Monitor. The dominance of New Vision can be seen in the circulation of both papers with
the New Vision holding a nearly sixty-five percent (65%) market share.24 With English
language papers being the only nationally distributed ones, the government is easily able
to influence public discourse on any pressing national topic. When taken in connection
with the high distribution in the non-English language papers one quickly can see the
dominance political authorities have over civil society discourse and potential actions.
Cultural Power in Uganda
Tribal authorities have traditional held cultural power in Uganda. Due to the
nature of British colonial boundaries multiple centers of cultural power have existed
within the country. Given that individuals acquire cultural power through their ability to
dictate societal norms of behavior these multiple centers of power have competed and at
times collided with one another. While there is not space to give a detailed recital of the
traditional kingdoms in present day Uganda, suffice it to say that the most prominent and
powerful kingdom is the kingdom Buganda.25 Given its status within Uganda, the
Buganda kingdom holds great sway in shaping the future of Ugandan society. For this
reason Buganda kingdom will be used as a case for examining cultural power in Uganda
and the ways in which it influences the society.
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As an institutional regime Buganda kingdom receives great loyalty from its
people.26 This loyalty is often fiercely held among its members. One kingdom member
was quick to point that he considered himself first a Baganda before several other group
associations. He then pointed out that being a Ugandan was maybe fifth or sixth down on
the list of self-described associational relationships.27 This loyalty turns into strict
adherence to kingdom interests. Some government actions cannot become legitimate in
the eyes of the people without the ‘blessing’ of traditional kingdom heads.28 However,
this is not always the case.
Furthermore, the population living within Buganda kingdom is the largest of any
traditional kingdom in the country. Combined with the kingdom loyalty mentioned above
Buganda often plays a kingmaker role in Uganda presidential politics. Despite the
historic tensions between Buganda and the presidential office,29 the kingdom has mostly
been a supporter of Museveni’s government. This quasi-official support of Museveni has
allowed him to retain some of the popular legitimacy within Buganda kingdom that he
originally had in the beginning of his tenure. Yet despite this support the kingdom still
(and this is true of the other kingdoms also) has legitimate concerns over the continued
attempts of the central government to acquire cultural power.
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Increasingly Museveni is moving to strip traditional authorities (not just in
Buganda, but in the entire country) of their ability to shape the behavioral norms of their
subjects. Specifically, Museveni continues to quarrel with some traditional authorities
regarding their proper role should be in national politics. During the most recent election
cycle Museveni made it clear that traditional rulers of all ethnic backgrounds had no
place in national politics and moved to codify this position.30 The pushback from these
authorities forced the regime to slightly modify legislation. Nonetheless it still passed
parliament and became law, thus curbing the cultural power of traditional authorities.
Conclusion
This chapter has presented a framework for analyzing power in societies and
applied it to the case of the current Ugandan society. What this analysis reveals is
Museveni’s government currently holds the vast majority of power in society (see Figure
5). This acquisition of systemic power gives Museveni the ability to pursue, and secure,
his two main interests virtually unopposed from the other elements of society. Ironically,
Museveni’s two interests are conflictual. Firstly, his interest is to maintain power in
Uganda’s ethnically diverse society in order to bring about national and economic
development. Museveni believes that his government is the only government capable of
achieving this goal. Secondly, his interests, rhetorically at least, is to shift power away
from political leaders in hopes of overcoming the ethnic divisions within Uganda society.
The irony lies in the fact that maintaining power makes shifting power towards social
identities less likely.
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The model below represents how power relationships in Uganda are currently
structured. As argued above the Museveni government has taken several measures to
monopolize cultural power in Uganda and therefore cultural power is currently firmly
centered within the political authorities of society. One can also notice from the model
that the relationship between social identities and political elements runs in only oneway: from political elements to social identities. As will be argued in further detail
throughout this thesis, social identities have little ability to organize to act as a check on
runaway political power. In essence, they have become subjects to political authorities
instead of active participants. Despite this inability of social identities to check runaway
political power, political authorities have not overwhelmed the entire system. A two-way
relationship between the political and economic elements continues to exist. Therefore it
is possible, but unlikely due to the relative prosperity gains achieved under the Museveni
regime, that the economic elements can check runaway political power.
Figure 5. Model of Power Relationships in Museveni’s Uganda
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Given this model I argue that the political elements of Uganda dominate the
society within a distinct north-south ethnic divide. In order to achieve the most important
goals of economic and national development the regime has to confront its own
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centralization of power while balancing the historic ethnic tensions of the society.
Museveni’s acquisition systemic power also does not portend positively for the Ugandan
society’s ability to achieve these goals. The likelihood of the transferring power away
from political authorities is unlikely given the ways Museveni has maintained societal
power. The exception to this would be another violent political transition.
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CHAPTER TWO: MAINTAINING POWER IN UGANDA’S ETHNIC SOCIETY
From the Bush to the Banquet: Distributive Patronage under Museveni
Museveni’s ability to maintain political power in Uganda’s ethnically divided
society rests on his ability to leverage institutional patronage in the pursuit of his two
earlier referenced interests. Institutional patronage in Uganda takes two forms:
decentralization and co-optations of civil society. The institutional nature of the
patronage network makes it more difficult to differentiate it from normal government
activities. This section argues that Museveni’s patronage strategy contains multiple
internal inconsistencies due to his competing interests. Inconsistencies that derive from
Museveni’s attempts to bridge key divisions within Ugandan’s society. The ultimate
consequence of these inconsistencies is the further centralization of power within
political authorities.
Democracy Now: Government Decentralization in Uganda
The purpose of any good patronage network is to weld individuals and groups to a
single political authority, via favors, positions, and other forms of graft. In a hybrid
regime31 such as Uganda’s political authorities often use tactics that “weaken all
independent centers of power”32 in order to accomplish this task. Andrew Mwenda calls
these attempts to weaken independent centers of power in Uganda the “institutional
fragmentation” of the government.33 In describing this fragmentation Mwenda details
how Museveni and his government have contributed to a proliferation of organizations
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and government levels. The growth of administrative sub-national districts is an example
of this phenomenon. In 1980, six years prior to Museveni’s military takeover there were
33 administrative districts and at the end of 2010 there were 112 districts34(see Figure 1)
and recent reports suggest that the government is going to create 21 new districts bringing
the total to 133 districts.35 This is a staggering amount of districts36 when one remembers
that according the latest census data Uganda has roughly 25 million37 people and best
estimates of present day population is around 33 million.38 Mwenda argues that this has
been one of the most effective ways for Museveni to enlarge his patronage.39Furthermore,
the local governments are a direct reflection of the larger patronage network and the
growth thereof.40The expanding nature of the patronage network is disturbing to
concerned social identities as this growth represents political authorities’ attempts to
acquire larger amounts political power.
Along with the number of districts, the distribution of districts throughout the four
regions of Uganda is another indicator that the government has used institutional
decentralization as part of its patronage network. Museveni and the NRM receive their
strongest support from the west and central regions of the country and conversely receive
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the least amount of support from the northern and eastern regions. Historic ethnic
tensions in existence (and continues to exist) at the time of Museveni’s consolidation of
power are to blame for this distribution of support.41 According to the most recent
national census conducted in 2002, 5,363,669 people live in the northern region, live
6,204,915 people in the eastern region, 6,575,425 people live in the central region and
6,298,075 people live in the western region. As of July 2010 the northern region of
Uganda had 30 districts, the eastern region had 32, the central region had 24 and the
western region had 26. If the purpose of decentralization is to allow Ugandans more
opportunities to participate in government and better representation in parliament then
would it not follow that there would be more districts in the central and western regions
than the northern and eastern? That the data demonstrates the opposites suggests that the
regime is creating districts within the northern and eastern regions of the country as a
patronage mechanism to bridge the ethnic divide hindering deeper governmental
legitimacy in the region.
Any perception of tribal and ethnic group preference in the government has
historically created divisions within Uganda. The creation of more districts in the north
and east is an attempt to bridge this tribal divide through patronage. In creating these
districts the government has attempted the dual purpose of creating better governance
structures, or at least the appearance thereof, while extending its reach into areas of less
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support.42 If successful the government will not only have overcome historical ethnic
tensions and shifted power towards social identities in the north and east, but also will
have manufactured political support in previously unfriendly regions.
Figure 1. Administrative Districts in Uganda.43
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Under this guise of increased democratic accountability Museveni has been able
to extend his reach throughout Ugandan society. Museveni’s statement upon the creation
of 14 new districts in 2005 reflects his rhetoric that increasing the number of districts
increases democracy in Uganda: “although a new district takes a lot of money, this is the
democracy we fought for. People must ask for what they want and get.”44With the large
sums of money distributed at the start of a new district it is easy to see why the
government has used decentralization as the cover for its patronage network.45 It is easier
to extend a patronage network when the money is offered through formal government
channels than it is to transfer suitcases of cash around. The ability of the government to
use its formal revenue distribution structures hides much of this distribution.
Analyzing the categories of revenue district administrations receive from the
central government illustrates how this decentralization process has operated as part of
the patronage regime. Local governments receive approximately 39 different categories
of funding from the central government. These categories range from various types of
salaries to infrastructure/maintenance issues. Two of these funding categories are of a
more dubious nature: the district unconditional grant and the urban unconditional grant.
The regime gives these funds to “local governments to spend on activities, which the
local governments themselves choose, such as salaries, administrative costs, and
development activities.”46 While the government does attempt to publicize the amount of
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money distributed to the local government under these categories in order to facilitate
social identities holding officials more accountable, it is nonetheless too easy for local
governments to siphon this money to suit their personal interests.47 If the central
government had an interest in reforming the system it would eliminate these
unconditional grants. The ease at which these grants can be distributed makes them a
perfect option of economic patronage to distribute throughout the north and east of the
country.
Rhetorically, Museveni began this decentralization process much for the same
reasons that any decentralization takes place: increased democratic functioning and
efficiency. However, instead of creating a more efficient and accountable government
structure as one would expect, it has “become and ally and reinforcer of personal rule.”48
Decentralization has allowed more individuals to receive state funding and these
individuals have become beholden to the government and not to other centers of power.
In essence what started under donor pressure to decentralize was co-opted for personal
purposes. Thus, the decentralization scheme in did little to shift power away from
themselves in society, but had the opposite effect of actually centralizing greater power in
their hands. Lastly, the expansion of districts in the north and east of the country has
allowed Museveni to extend his reach deeper into ethnically unfriendly portions of the
country.
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Rearranging the Chairs: Cabinet Appointments under Museveni
While decentralization has been a powerful patronage mechanism to bridge ethnic
divisions in the north and eastern regions of the country, the regime has used cabinet
positions as distributive patronage for the west and central regions. By promoting
individuals from his own ethnic region Museveni undermines his attempts to bridge
national ethnic tensions. Museveni’s promotion of individuals from the west and central
regions to cabinet posts is at odds with his rhetoric of a unified and ‘non-sectarian’
Uganda. The government reinforces the historical north-south ethnic tensions through the
exclusion of northern politicians from viably participating in governing the country. By
failing to bridge this historic tension the government fails to shift power away from the
political authorities in society; by reinforcing the underlying historic ethnic tensions
Museveni reinforces his own power in society.
Since taking office the size of Museveni’s cabinet has dramatically increased in
size and ethnic uniformity has characterized its composition. For most of Uganda’s postindependence history the size cabinet ranged from between 15-30 ministers.49 This
pattern persisted in the early years of the Museveni era. However, following his victory in
the 2001 elections, in which the first real signs of political opposition emerged, Museveni
quickly increased the cabinet to 65 ministers. He then increased the size to 69 ministers in
2006 and again to 74 following the 2011 elections.50 This packing of the cabinet “allows
[Museveni] to personalize decision-making authority without necessarily weakening the
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capacity of the organizations in question.”51 Museveni’s ability to expand the cabinet
beyond the constitutional limit of 21 ministers derives, at least up until now, from the
absence of an effective parliamentary opposition.52 MPs and the regime share a common
interest in this further institutionalization of patronage. The constitution stipulates
parliamentary approval is required to the size of the cabinet and the regime relies on its
parliamentary cadre to expand the institutional nature of the patronage regime in this
way.53 The regime can secure more support through political appointments and MPs can
demonstrate their NRM credentials in hopes of receiving a cabinet level ministerial post.
This common interest in constructing cabinet patronage undermines governmental
efforts at bridging ethnic divides elsewhere in society and undermines its efforts to shift
power away towards social identities. Since the majority of the central government
support comes from the west and central regions of the country, the majority of the NRM
cadre in parliament is from the Bantu portion of the country. This in turn facilitates the
broad ethnic uniformity in Museveni’s cabinet composition. A recent report in The
Observer, a leading Ugandan newspaper, notes the following historical pattern within
Museveni’s cabinet:
Of the 229 ministers Museveni has so far had for the 25 years he has been
president, 70 have hailed from western Uganda, which accounts for 30.6%,
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followed by 65 from the central region (28.4%). Eastern Uganda has had 51
ministers (22.3%) and the north, 43 (18.8).54
This historical pattern also presents itself in the current cabinet (Table 1). Given
the historic tensions between the Bantu southern parts of the country and non-Bantu
north, Museveni’s distribution of ministerial positions to those of Bantu origin creates a
perception (or reality) of ethnic uniformity within the cabinet, thus further entrenching
north/south ethnic distrust.55This distrust disrupts any possibility of shifting power
towards social identities. Without the necessary cross-ethnic trust in place the
government only serves to reinforce its own power in society, while weakening the
ability of the society to shift power away from political authorities.
Table 1. Current Regional Composition of Ugandan Cabinet.56
Region
Total Cabinet Posts

Senior Level Posts

Western

22

13

Central

21

10

Eastern

18

4

Northern

14

3

The different patronage strategies towards the north/east and west/central are
significant in that they reveal the extent to which the regime’s rhetoric of overcoming
tribalism and sectarianism in order to shift power towards social identities is mere
54
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rhetoric. On the one hand, decentralization as a patronage mechanism allows the regime
to extend its reach into discontented areas to buy their loyalty with patronage, oversee
any developments in the region, and support grassroots democracy within society. But,
the government’s actions elsewhere illustrate its lack of intention of moving democracy
down a decentralized path that does not ultimately benefit its own ends. Buying support
allows the government to modestly bridge the north/south ethnic tensions that have
dominated sub-regional political interactions over history. However, this modest bridging
is limited only to the interactions between the central government and these sub regions.
It has not extended to other north/south interactions. Therefore the regime has not
actually overcome the historic ethnic tensions permeating Ugandan society, but rather
leveraged modern political ideologies imported from the West to manufacture support in
an otherwise hostile region.
On the other hand cabinet positions have been used in the west and central regions
to reward loyalty and to shore up political bases, thus actually further entrenching the
very ethnic tensions the regime seeks to end. Unlike in the north and east of the country,
the west and central have historically been supportive of Museveni and this support has
not gone unnoticed. The subsequent cabinet appointments have strengthened the
relationship between the regime and Bantu ethnic groups. Overtime these strengthened
relationships have acted as a check on sectarianism in this region as more and more
ethnic groups give loyalty to the regime; however, and more dangerously, it has served to
strengthen the ethnic tensions between the northern and southern ethnic groupings.
Despite Museveni’s attempts to bridge ethnic divisions through distributive patronage the
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ethnic tension dividing Uganda have not subsided. This dualistic nature of his patronage
strategy is to blame and only serves to undermine attempts to reshape societal power
structures.
Conflicted Loyalties: Women’s Representatives in Uganda’s Parliament
Along with decentralization and the distribution of cabinet positions Museveni’s
government has been able to co-opt civil society movements in an attempt to reshape the
political discourse. In doing this, political authorities have curbed citizen’s attempts at
acquiring the power needed to check anyway possible runaway growth of political power.
One of the most prominent examples of this is the establishment of the women’s quota
representation system in parliament. The quota system effectively co-opted one of the
larger civil society movements in Uganda. Its establishment was meant to appease a
vibrant women’s movement in the early days following the 1986 power consolidation.
This early appeasement of the women’s movement wedded the women’s representatives
in parliament to the NRM, despite sometimes-divergent legislative views.
Early after the success of the bush war, Museveni recognized the need to
incorporate the women’s movement within his government. Once in power he moved
quickly to distribute government positions to the women’s movement. However, these
positions were not in the form of powerful ministerial positions, but rather they were
added-on quota seats for women’s representatives in parliament. These seats were tied to
the number of administrative districts, and as such their number keeps growing. This
continued growth in the number of districts further co-opts the women’s movement as
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greater numbers of women’s representatives are elected to parliament and become part of
the formal government power structure.
Far from advancing women’s political standing in the Ugandan parliament and in
the broader government this add-on quota has actually served to stifle women’s political
power and coherence.57Women’s quota seats have left many women feeling conflicted
about who they actually represent – women or the constituents in their district.58 Ann
Marie Goetz argues that this mechanism for women’s participation is “based on the
principle of extending patronage to a new clientele.”59 The current quota system
discourages the women’s movement from developing a certain level of autonomy due to
its reliance on formal government structures, mainly parliament, for its voice in society.
Instead of developing this needed autonomy the women’s movement is gradually
becoming, or in many instances has become, part of Museveni’s system.
Women’s representatives MPs party affiliation demonstrates how this lack of
autonomy actually incorporates the movement into Museveni’s patronage system. Table
2 illustrates how women’s representatives overwhelmingly have chosen to affiliate with
the NRM. 73% of all women’s representative are affiliated with the ruling party. This is
nine percentage points higher than the overall NRM representation in parliament, which
has 210 MPs out of the total 327 or 64%. This suggests that the women’s representatives
are part of the patronage system and see their opportunity for a voice in society as tied to
the NRM. It further suggests that the regime has co-opted the women’s movement as
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function of its patronage network. By co-opting a large portion of the civil society
movement the regime has been able to stifle citizen’s attempts to acquire citizen power
through the women’s movement. This stifling has allowed the regime to avoid shifting
power towards social identities on the grounds that the social identities are already a part
of the regime itself. Justifying its power acquisition in this manner further entrenches
power within the political elements of society.
Table 2. Party Affiliation of Women’s Representative MPs in 8th Parliament.60
Party Affiliation

Number

NRM

58

Independent

11

Forum for Democratic Change (FDC)

10

Total

79

In general the co-optation women’s movement also represents a significant
attempt at bridging the tribal tensions in Uganda’s political system. By focusing
patronage on the broader women’s movement and not simply women from one tribe, the
government can claim to be reaching out to bridge the ethnic divides via civil society and
the women’s movement. This allows the regime to deflect any criticisms of favoring one
ethnic group over another. In essence the regime has been able to shape the political
discourse away from ethnic politics via its patronage of civil society
.The NRM patronage system is vast and growing larger. With the number of
districts increasing on an almost yearly basis the reach of Museveni and the government
extends into ever-smaller units of society. Increasing administrative districts also serves
60
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the political purpose of distributing patronage to ever-larger percentages of the
population in hopes of bridging ethnic tensions. However, this practice is undermined by
Museveni’s regionally based appointment of cabinet ministers. Furthermore, the
continued use of parliamentary quotas for women’s government representation creates
fragmented loyalties within the women’s movement. And keeping the quota system as
part of the legislative institutional structure political authorities can assure support from a
large portion of society.
While institutionalizing patronage networks requires more effort than simply
distributing benefits doing so has clearly benefitted the Museveni government. Despite
promoting itself as a new type of regime the Museveni era has been characterized by
many of the same political practices of previous Ugandan governments. The regime has
not significantly changed since independence and political authorities have created a
political environment that encourages the further institutionalization of patronage and
personal rule in Uganda. This political culture creates institutional inertia against the
reconstructing of societal power within society by further entrenching north/south ethnic
tensions.
Repression
When patronage is not adequate the government has employed various means of
both institutional and violent repression. Because Museveni promoted himself and his
regime as a new model of African leadership the regime could not continue the brutal
violence of the Amin government; however, the NRM has created a delicate balance of
violent intimidation and institutionalized repression of basic constitutional freedoms,
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such as the freedom of speech and association. In regards to violence the government has
employed ‘private’ plain cloth militias, the police and the Uganda People’s Defense
Force (UPDF) to intimidate and coerce social identities into following government
demands. The government's response in three separate cases (the 2009 Kayunga riots, the
2010 Kasubi Tomb burning riots, and the 2011 Walk-to-Work protests) illustrates their
employment of repression as a tool to curb the ability of social identities to acquire power
in society. In each situation the government moved to curtail constitutional rights via
presidential decree and enforced these decrees via violence. These instances also
demonstrate the regime’s primary interests of maintaining power at the expense of
shifting societal power towards social identities.
2009 Kayunga Riots
Relations between the Buganda Kingdom and the central government have been
tense since independence. The tensions derive from the central role the Buganda
Kingdom played during the colonial era.61 The highly organized kingdom has always
pressed the central government to create a federal structure along the lines of the
traditional kingdoms of the region. The Buganda kingdom would highly benefit from
this system, as it is the best-organized and most populous kingdom in Uganda. However,
precisely because it is the best-organized and most populous traditional kingdom in
Uganda the central government fears the impacts the involvement of the Kabaka (king of
Buganda kingdom) could have on its power. This tension has created a delicate balance
for the government in managing its political relationship with the Buganda kingdom. Any
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sign of power shifting away from the government triggers a repressive response from the
central government.
In 2009 the Kabaka planned to preside over a Buganda youth festival being held
in Kayunga. The disapproval of a local Museveni appointed chief sparked internal strife
between the local chief and the Kabaka. Despite the disapproval and the strife it created
within the Kingdom the Kabaka decided to go ahead with the planned event. This
decision prompted the local community in Kayunga to petition the Buganda Parliament to
secede from the Kingdom. In connection with this petition some elements of the local
community continued to demonstrate against the Kabaka’s visit. Unmoved by the protests
the Kabaka’s office determined that the event would go ahead as planned. In accordance
with the event-planning schedule the Kabaka’s advanced preparation team began local
preparations for the festival, which caused further demonstrations. Amidst these internal
kingdom protests the central government misread the protests as something larger than an
internal dispute. This misreading of the protests led police to begin firing teargas on the
Kabaka’s advanced team and other protestors in the area. The government’s actions
united the Buganda youth against the central government.
On September 10th the Katikiro (equivalent of prime minster) and other ministers
of the Kingdom attempted to visit Kayunga to oversee preparations for the festival. As
they attempted to enter the region police forces barred them from entering the region on
the grounds that the visit would promote further instability and that it was unsafe. Once
news of this action spread anti-government protests and riots erupted throughout
Kampala and the suburbs. These protests were a sign that the possibility of power shifting
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towards social identities and away from the regime. In response to these protests
government forces moved quickly to quell the protests using teargas and other violent
measures. The government also forced the silence of the Buganda Kingdom’s radio
station, the Central Broadcasting Service (CBS), for inciting violence in Kampala and
throughout Buganda Kingdom. All told over a four-day span of protests four people were
killed and scores injured.
2010 Kasubi Tombs Burning
Several months after the Kayunga protests on the morning of March 16, 2010 the
Kasubi Tombs, which were the ceremonial burial grounds of several previous Kabakas,
were burned to the ground. Originally it was unclear what the cause of the fire was and
some suspected the government of involvement in burning the tombs.62 The following
day the current Kabaka visited the tombs with President Museveni. Large numbers
Bagandan youth demonstrated against the President’s visit and attempted to block him
from entering the area. In an effort to curb the protests and allow the president’s visit to
occur police fired lived ammunition into the crowds killing three people. Again this was a
clear attempt by the Bugandan youth to organize against political authorities in order to
influence government actions. Thus, the government moved to stop power moving away
from the regime.
While this event did not turn into more than an isolated incident, tensions
remained high throughout Kampala for several days. One Kampala resident remarked, “it
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was as if the country would explode into a civil war.”63 Unlike the protests seven months
earlier the central government did not move to institutionally repress civil rights by
restricting constitutionally protected acts. However, the use of live ammunition to
disperse protests at an important Buganda cultural site illustrates the ready nature of the
Museveni government to employ violence to repress civil rights. Employing force to
curtail these civil rights undermines any citizen attempts to check runaway political
power, since they lack the capabilities of violence necessary to check the military power
of state.
2011 Walk-to-Work Protests
The 2011 walk-to-work protests continued to demonstrate political authorities’
use of institutional and violent repression against any societal attempts to shift power
away from the government. While the protests began in mid-April 2011 the events in the
months preceding the protests help establish the context. In late February 2011 Uganda
held parliamentary and presidential elections with Museveni running for a fourth fiveyear term against several opposition candidates. The general sentiment previous to the
election was that Museveni was going to face his closest election decision since the
resumption of elections in 1995; however, Museveni ended up winning in a landslide
fashion securing 68% of the vote.64The opposition candidates immediately decried the
elections as illegitimate charging the regime with vote rigging and buying. From this
context of a landslide, but deeply flawed, victory the protests developed.
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In a rare demonstration of opposition solidarity, the opposition candidates
uniformly called for protests65. In fear of widespread protests, similar to those sweeping
over North Africa and the Middle East at the time, the government banned all public
demonstrations and took other measures to ensure any protests would not get out of
hand.66 Despite the feverish nature of the call for protests none materialized and the
government seemed to stave off any attempts to check its growing political power.
This uneasy aftermath of the election continued until late March 2011. Amidst
rising worldwide oil and commodity prices Ugandans began to face a steep rise in the
cost of living. The opposition used this steep rise as a rallying cry forsocial identities to
join them in walking to work as a means of protest over the high prices. The main
demand of the protests was for the government to cut the tax rate on fuel, which stood at
roughly Sh850 per liter of fuel.67 Many social identities throughout the country joined the
opposition in walking to work on April 11th.68 These protests were attempts to acquire
citizen power and to influence the course of government decisions and become active
participants in the political process. While initially a peaceful protest against rising fuel
and food prices the movement quickly turned violent as the regime moved to curb social
identities’ attempts to organize.
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For example shortly after leaving their homes police stopped opposition
authorities Kizza Besigye (from the south) and Norbert Mao (from the north) in their
attempts to walk to work. The police argued that these individuals were illegally
demonstrating against the government and had not properly notified the police of their
intentions. Their detainments reshaped the protests from protests against inflationary
pressures to anti-government protests throughout the country. It should be noted that
these demonstrations were not confined to any ethnic sub region, but rather were
nationwide. While not marching side by side, both northern and southern ethnic groups
demonstrated against the government’s repressive response and its unwillingness to
combat inflationary pressures. This national response demonstrates some possible
underlying common interests from which society can leverage to bridge its north/south
ethnic divide.
Not only were the protests nationwide, but also the government’s response was
much the same in all regions of the country. The government’s response was to fire tear
gas and rubber bullets into crowds. In one instance during this initial response Kizza
Besigye was hit in the hand by a rubber bullet, breaking one of his fingers. Other similar
instances of violence occurred in northern Uganda. After several days of formal protests
and several arrests, the Rapid Response Unit (a plain clothed Museveni supporting
militia) was deployed against Besigye and violently arrested the opposition
leader.69Despite this violence protests continued. After a few days of protests the army
and military police were called in to restore order and dispel protestors. While the police
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fired rubber bullets and tear gas the army and military police used live ammunition
resulting in the death of at least four individuals including a two-and-a-half year old
girl.70 At this point it was clear that the government cared nothing for bridging ethnic
divisions, but rather maintaining its systemic power.
Concurrent to this violent response from the government, the government also
institutionally represses constitutional rights via decree. In the beginning of the protests
the government announced a ban on live coverage of the protests: no media outlet was
allowed to produce live videos or pictures of the protests.71 The government stated that it
did not want the media to incite the country to violence over the protest. This banning of
live coverage of the demonstrations has now become the basis for proposed legislation in
parliament to ban live coverage of all future protests and demonstrations.72 Again the
reason given is the need to avoid the media inciting violence throughout the country. One
must ask however why the government would ban live media coverage of a peaceful
protest over the cost of fuel?
Clearly, the regime feels threatened by the demonstrations and the potential
delegitimizing nature they possessed. It was clear from these protests that social identities
were seeking to directly influence the course of government policy, and thus acquire
power within the system. Their acquisition of power would have directly decreased the
regime ability to maintain its systemic power. Facing these threats to its power the
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government responded to maintain its power. Thus again, political authorities
demonstrated that their primary interest is not to reconstruct structural power in society,
but rather to maintain its own power in society at all costs.
Conclusion
These three examples illustrate the way in which the Museveni regime has
resorted to violence and institutional repression in order to maintain systemic power.
While defending its actions under the guise of maintaining stability, which would bring
about prosperity, political authorities have institutionally oppressed civil rights and killed
many social identities.73 Closing the CBS radio station due to their alleged incitement of
violence during the 2009 Kayunga riots, the banning of protests during the 2011 Walk-toWork protests, and the banning of live coverage of demonstrations are examples of the
way political authorities used institutional means to repress social identities. In each case
the government curtailed the freedom of speech and association by governmental decree.
The constitution of Uganda enshrines these rights by stating: “every person shall have the
right to freedom of speech and expression which shall include the press and other
media…[and] freedom to assemble and to demonstrate together with others peacefully
and unarmed to petition.”74 Both of these freedoms are critical to maintaining a truly
stable society. Furthermore, the violent responses during all three incidents are typical of
how the Museveni government has used violence to repress social identities.75
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CHAPTER THREE: CONSEQUENCES OF MUSEVENI’S EXTENDED TENURE
The previous chapter argued that Museveni and his government have focused on
maintaining power in Uganda society through patronage and repression. The government
has continually argued that the reason for its actions is to promote stability, which would
then lead to economic and national development.76 The chapter further argued that the
government’s actions demonstrated its primary interest of maintaining systemic power
over reconstructing the structural distribution of societal power. By maintaining its own
systemic power, political authorities had several effects on the society in regards to
economic and national development. This chapter will now review some of the positive
and negative consequences of the government’s choice to pursue its own power
maintenance over reconstructing structural power. In other words, what have been the
actual positive and negative effects of the Museveni government on Ugandan society in
relation to economic and national development?
Positive Consequences
Relative macroeconomic stability and increased national development are the
main positive consequences of the Museveni’s decision to pursue the maintenance of his
systemic power. While political patronage and repression do have severe negative
consequences for any state some minimal efficiencies are gained through an authoritarian
system. Specifically, the ability to focus the national government on a narrow range of
priorities has allowed the Museveni government to bring about the aforementioned
positive changes in Ugandan society. Despite these efficiencies and positive benefits
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flowing from the distinct north/south ethnic divide continues to play prominently in many
aspects of these positive consequences. The negative aspects associated with this
north/south divide continue to allow political authorities to further maintain systemic
power.
Macroeconomic Climate
Inflation
Inflationary pressures can stifle the growth of any economy and create a tinderbox
of political dissent among various social identities. Inflation under the Museveni regime
has remained relatively stable year over year and has decreased since the regime came to
power. Chart 1 illustrates inflation in Uganda since 1980 as measured in the percent
change in consumer prices year over year. Inflation was on a runaway trajectory prior to
Museveni’s consolidation of power and was anything but stable or predictable. Once
inflation was brought under control around 1992-93 the inflation rate in Uganda has been
an average of 7.4%.77 While 7.4% is relatively high, inflationary stability has existed
since the government came to power.
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Chart 1. Inflation in Uganda since 1980, Consumer Prices (Annual %)78
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This inflationary stability is critical for ordinary Ugandans. While the government
and Ugandans certainly would like more moderate inflation expectations year over year,
the very fact that the inflation rate has hovered around 7-8% per year signals to
consumers and investors what they can expect in the marketplace in the following months
and year. In other words, while prices have continued to rise in Uganda under the current
government, these rises have been fairly predictable; thus allowing the state and its social
identities to plan for expenses from month to month and year to year. This predictability
within the macroeconomic situation gives the country a sense of calm amidst rising
prices.
International Trade Statistics
Stability in international trade is a key determinant of the overall stability of a
country’s macroeconomic environment. In a country with a stable macroeconomic
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environment one would expect to see relatively the same current account and capital
account balances year over year. While slight variations will exist depending on the
overall health and structure of the world economy, one would expect the current accounts
and capital accounts to be relatively stable if a country is pursuing a coherent trading
strategy. Since Museveni’s consolidation of power this is what we see in Uganda. What
we also see from both the current and capital account charts (Chart 2-3) is that there are
no large swings in either direction, positive or negative (with the exception of 1993 and
2006 in the capital account) in either the capital or current accounts. This reveals that
countries are viewing the Ugandan state as a viable trading partner: they are not worried
about violent changes in the macroeconomic situation of the country that would make
trade or investment unprofitable.
Chart 2. Current Account Balance since 1980 (% of GDP)79
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Chart 3. Capital Account Balance since 1993 (BoP, current US $)80
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International Investment
Stable inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) are another indicator of an
improved macroeconomic climate during the Museveni era (see Chart 4). Previous to the
NRM’s consolidation of power in 1986 very little FDI flowed into Uganda. Obote’s
“Charter of the Common Man”, the subsequent policy shift towards more socialist
leaning policies, and Amin’s expulsion of Asian’s and expropriation of their property left
many foreign companies and investors leery of doing business in Uganda. While by no
means perfect today, steps have been taken to assure the international business
community that Uganda is a safe place to invest and do business under the current
government.81 This steady inflow of FDI has contributed to the overall improvement of
the economic situation of most Ugandan’s under the Museveni regime. However, there is
a distinct north/south aspect to these improvements.
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Chart 4. Foreign Direct Investment in Uganda since 1980 (net inflows % of GDP)82
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

0

National Income
In monetary terms Uganda, as a whole, has experienced rapid development gains
over the past 25 years. Chart 5 illustrates the growth in total GDP since 1986. The table
reveals that in 1986 the GDP was roughly $4 billion and in 2009 the GDP was just below
$16 billion. This nearly fourfold increase in total GDP has been driven by an annual
growth rate of 6.5% between 1986-2009. Furthermore, this growth in GDP has translated
in the growth in GDP/capita as evidenced in Chart 6. In 1986 GDP/capita was a little
over $250 and in 2009 it was $490. What these two charts do not show is the dramatic
differences in income between the northern and southern regions of the country. The
difference between the amounts of individuals living below the poverty line in the north
compared to the south in staggering (Table 3). While the government has made good
progress fighting poverty in the north this income disparity is a driver of ethnic tension in
the country. Many northerners see this disparity as a result of policies the Museveni
government has pursued that are specifically favoring the southern region over the north.
82

World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database 1960-2009”.

61

Millions

Chart 5. Ugandan GDP 1986-2009 (Current US $)83
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Chart 6. Ugandan GDP/capita 1986-2009 (Current US $)84
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Table 3. Poverty Headcount Ratio (% of total population) in Uganda, by region.85
Region
Central
Eastern
Northern
Western

1992/93
45.6
58.8
72.2
53.1

1997
27.9
54.3
60.9
42.8

1999/00
19.7
35.0
63.6
26.2

83

2002/03
22.3
46.0
63.3
31.4

2005/06
16.4
35.9
60.7
20.5

W World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database 1960-2009”.
Ibid.
85
Theophane Nikyema, Millennium Development Goals: Uganda’s Progress Report, 2007 (United
Nations, 2007), 15.
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National Development
Since Museveni’s ascendency and consolidation of power Uganda has
experienced consistent national development across many segments of society.
Specifically, Uganda has experienced large increases in the receipt of international donor
support and in leveraging this donor support towards gains in human capital
development. Each of these sectors has been important to the overall development of the
Ugandan economy. The national government hopes to continue to build on these previous
gains and transform Uganda from a traditional society to a modern one in within thirty
years.86 In order to accomplish this task the government must focus on leveraging the
gains previously experienced in order to generate further advances in economic
development.
International Funding Gains
Museveni’s government has used international donor support as a key pillar in its
overall economic development strategy since coming to power in 1986. The government
close relationship with the World Bank exemplifies this ability to attract international
funding. The regime’s active courting of this aid support has contributed towards to
overall economic development in Uganda since 1986.87 However, this active courting has
not been without ulterior motives. Despite the positive benefits have occurred as a result
of this funding political authorities have used this relationship as another mechanism to
maintain societal power.
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The Republic of Uganda, National Development Plan 2010/11-2014/15, (Kampala: Government of
Uganda, April 2010), 1.
87
William Easterly, “Can Aid Buy Growth,” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, vol. 167 no. 3
(Summer, 2003): 36.
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Table 3 outlines the number of World Bank projects during the four major
administrations of Uganda’s post-independence political history. The average number of
projects per year under Milton Obote, including both tenures, is roughly 2.5 projects per
year. Under Amin the average was less than one project per year and the majority (4 out
of 5) of the projects were in some way related to the East African regional integration
scheme. Under Museveni, Uganda has received an average of 5.3 projects per year.
While some of these projects are relatively localized projects most deal with the national
economy as a whole. These national level projects characterize the top down
development strategy the government has employed since 1986. Securing these projects
has brought the regime legitimacy among some portions of society. This legitimacy
translates directly into increased political power. Therefore this relationship with the
World Bank is another mechanism the government is using to acquire systemic power.
Table 3. Number of World Bank Projects by Major Administration88
Administration (Years)

Number of Projects

Obote I (1962-1971)

16

Amin (1971-1979)

5

Obote II (1980-1985)

16

Museveni (1986-Present)

132

Table 4 charts the total amount of loans received from the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the International Development Association

88

World Bank, World Bank Project Database, Uganda, at http://web.worldbank.org/
external/defaul/main?menuPK=374972&pagePK=141143&piPK=399272&theSitePK=374864.
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(IDA). Both agencies are part of the World Bank Group.89The loan amounts trended
steadily upward prior to the 1986 power transition. However, this upward trend alone
does not account for the increase in average amounts received under the Museveni
regime. Since 1990 Uganda has received nearly $1 billion dollars in assistance from the
IBRD and IDA each year and as the table indicates an average of nearly $1.6 billion
dollars a year since 1986. These loans and credits have dramatically strengthened the
power of political authorities as they have given legitimacy to Museveni and others who
have been able to secure these funds for the country. Thus, the government can claim
(albeit probably falsely so) that its presence is necessary for further international funding.
Regardless of the validity of their claims in this regard, political authorities continue to
make them and increase in attempts leverage over society.
Table 4. Average Yearly IBRD Loans and IDA Credits (Current US $)90
Administration (Years)

Average Amount

Obote I (1962-1971)

No data

Amin (1971-1979)

41,076,222

Obote II (1980-1985)

143,045,833

Museveni (1986-Present)

1,597,053,667

Human Capital Gains
Measuring gains in human capital are difficult due to constraints on the
quantifiability of these measures. However, it is not impossible. Any measures that can
quantify greater capabilities of individuals can proxy for gains in human capital. These
89

The difference between them is that IBRD loans are given at prevailing market rates and IDA credits are
loans given at concessional rates.
90
World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database 1960-2009”.
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gains involve increasing the capabilities of individuals in order to allow them to have the
greater agency. This involves educational training, health, longevity, and so forth. While
these areas do create more self-confidence, leveraging these gains towards personal
economic development is contingent on the broader economy. In other words, an
individual can experience gains in their personal human capital stock, but without the
opportunities to put these gains to use in the broader economy they cannot tangibly
extract benefits; people needs jobs to translate human capital gains into the benefits
associated with a higher standard of living. While the monetary gains in Uganda are
significant and have contributed to a higher quality of life for Uganda’s under Museveni,
gains in human capital have not translated as tangibly to a higher quality of life.
Several statistics reveal in what areas these human capital gains are occurring.
Table 6 charts the percentage of Ugandans living to age 65 since 1998. A greater
percentage of a cohort population suggests at least two human capital gains. First, the
population as a whole has greater access to nutrition. When a population has access to a
more nutritious diet, they will naturally live longer. Second, the population has greater
access to health care services. Without this greater access it would not be possible to
overcome the disease burden a population encounters throughout its life cycle. Simply,
put without greater access to health care more individuals would die prior to reaching age
65.
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Table 6. Percentage of Population Cohort Living to Age 65.91
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Male
35
35
36
36
37
38
39
41
42
44
45

Female
29
30
31
33
34
35
37
38
40
42
43

Tables 7-9 illustrates the progress the governmentis making in educating its
population. Recently the government has made the education of its population a priority.
In line with this priority the government has consistently devoted roughly twenty percent
of its government expenditures to education. Table 8 shows what impact this is having on
the number of children that progress from primary school to secondary school. The
amount of students progressing onto secondary school has nearly doubled since 1995.
While this does have the potential to cause societal conflicts once these students graduate
and find it difficult to contract employment, increasing the amount of education
individuals receive is a positive step for Uganda. It also directly increases its human
capital stock.
Table 9 further illustrates the gains Uganda has made in educating its social
identities. When contextualized the decrease in per student expenditure that this table
demonstrates actually reveals some positive gains. The government has kept public
spending on education constant. The decrease in per student expenditure measured as a
91
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percentage of GDP/capita reveals that more students are attending school at each age
level. Again this increased attendance facilitates gains in the human capital stock in
Uganda.
Table 7. Public Spending on education, total (% of government expenditure)92
Year
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

Uganda
18.29
..
..
..
18.85

Table 8. Progression to secondary school (% of children in primary school)93
Year
1995
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

Uganda
34.00
42.04
39.95
42.2
37.77
36.19
37.43
42.87
58.45
61.33

Table 9. Expenditure per student by age level (% of GDP per capita)94
Age level
Primary
Secondary
Tertiary

2004
10.68
32.17
178.83

2005
..
..
..

2006
..
..
..

2007
..
..
..

2008
8.48
27.05
121.07

While these gains have been positive for the entire society, these gains in human
capital are not evenly dispersed between northern and southern Uganda. One statistic
reveals these disparities clearly. The net primary school enrollment by region between
92
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1992/1992 and 2002/2003 is significantly lower in the northern region than in any other
region of the country (Table 10).Here is another instance of a distinct north/south divide
of the benefits under Museveni. These disparities represent the same forms of neglect
seen previously in relation to income disparities. The government has not pursued, or
worse ignored, the development of human capital in the north. As with the other instances
of neglect one must begin to question the sincerity of political authorities attempts to
facilitate national development. More and more these attempts become actions to acquire
societal power. Neglecting the north in this manner creates further dependencies from
which political authorities can acquire greater political power
Table 10. Net Primary School Enrollment by Region.95
Region
Central
Eastern
Northern
Western

Girls
1992/93
69.1
62.0
29.7
60.4

2005
2002/03
85.3
89.7
72.5
88.0

2006
1992/93
69.0
66.7
55.4
62.3

2007
2002/03
85.1
89.4
73.5
84.3

Negative Consequences
The Militarization of Uganda
Uganda has always had a militaristic strain running through its political culture.
The Museveni tenure has only served to strengthen this aspect of political life in Uganda.
This strengthening gives the government greater power as they possess the means of
95

Table and figures from Kate Higgins, Regional Inequality and Primary Education in Northern Uganda,
Policy Brief No. 2, Overseas Development Institute (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2007):5,
downloaded at http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/2504.pdf (accessed 20 August 2011). The chart
is disaggregated into the four main regions of Uganda. Higgins notes that the wider northern region, of
which I am primarily referring to throughout this thesis, composes both the sub-regions within the northern
and eastern regions of Uganda. When this wider north construct is used the statistics still reveal a particular
level of neglect. The net school enrollment for girls in 2002/03 is 81.1% in the wider north and 86.6 in the
south. For boys the rate is 81.45 in the north and 84.7 in the south.
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military violence. Museveni’s personal background as the military leader of the NRA
only bolsters his own perceptions of the necessity of military power in governmental
leadership positions. To Museveni his military credentials are some of his strongest
qualities.96 This growing militarization can be most clearly seen in the growth in the size
and capability of the army, the rise in military expenditure under the regime and the
growth of private regime supported militias. While the militarization of Uganda can
easily by seen empirically, it is the role militarization continues to play in society that is
most disturbing.
The first place from which to view this militarization is with the central
government expenditures. When measured in terms of the overall percentage of
government expenditure and spending as a percentage of GDP, the regime has kept
military spending relatively stable at around 14% of total government expenditure and
2.4% of GDP. While this does not seem to be particularly alarming recall that Uganda
has experienced a near quadrupling of their national economy under the Museveni
regime. One would expect that the spending relative to total expenditure and GDP of a
non-militaristic regime would decrease over this economic growth. The stability of
spending under the regime signals its militaristic nature. Furthermore,the actual spending
on military expenditure (measured in local currency units) reveals a fuller picture of the
regime’s activities.
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Museveni recently stated his desire to be buried in his military uniform. By choosing this over another
form of burial clothing Museveni signals that his allegiance to the military and his former military life
defines him as a leader. This is particularly clear when one recalls that Museveni had little formal military
training that would qualify him for service as a military office, but rather he self-appointed himself as such.
See Anne Mugisa, “I Wont Allow Distuption – Museveni,” New Vision May 31, 2011, at
http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/756296 (accessed 23 July 2011) for the story.
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The regime spending on military has increased faster than inflation every year
since 1993 except between 2008-9. What this reveals is that the regime is using economic
growth partially as a cover to hide the growing militarization in Uganda. Frankly, the
regime hides its military expenditure growth behind stable expenditures relative to
overall expenditure and GDP. Table 10 bears this out more clearly as total real
expenditure is compared against what expenditure would hypothetically look like if
spending only grew with inflation.This increased spending has translated into steady
gains in both numbers of military personnel and in military equipment.97
Table 10. Real Amount of Military Expenditure98
Year

Real Amount (Uganda Schillings)

1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

74,852,000,000
101,987,000,000
123,055,000,000
141,632,000,000
151,206,000,000
191,892,000,000
232,343,000,000
232,370,000,000
239,046,000,000
255,597,000,000
299,232,000,000
354,848,000,000
385,813,000,000
400,234,000,000

Inflation
Matched
Amount
(Uganda
Schillings)
79,642,528,000
108,514,168,000
130,930,520,000
150,696,448,000
160,883,184,000
204,173,088,000
247,212,952,000
247,241,680,000
254,344,944,000
271,955,208,000
318,382,848,000
377,558,272,000
410,505,032,000
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The publication Military Balance states that Uganda had roughly 6000 regular troops and very little high
quality military equipment (International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, 1986-1987.
London: The Institute, 1986). The 2011 edition of the same publication stated that the Uganda now has
roughly 40000-45000, a substantive air force and a formidable arsenal of semi modern military equipment.
Uganda has substantially upgraded their numerical size and weapons capabilities during the Museveni era.
98
World Bank, “World Development Indicators Database 1960-2009”.

71

2007
2008
2009

478,150,000,000
640,500,000,000
662,500,000,000

425,848,976,000
508,751,600,000

Concurrent to the growth both in size and strength of Uganda’s military the
regime has utilized various paramilitary and security service organizations to ‘maintain
order’. Table 11 gives a list of these groups, their primary function and the year the group
was organized. This development is clearly alarming.
Table 11. Paramilitary and Security Groups in Uganda.
Organization Name
Kiboko Squad
Citizens Concerned
Boda-Boda Association
The Kalanga Action Plan
The Oil Wells Protection
Unit
Violent Crime Crack Unit
(VCCU)

Primary Function for
Regime
Harass Political
Opponents99
Pre-Election
Mobilization100

Approximate Year
Organized
2007
~2001

Intelligence Gathering101
Special Operations Unit of
UPDF102/Harass political
opponents103
Physical Security for Oil
Interests/Intelligence
Gathering in Oil Area105
Crime Fighting106

99

1996104

2003107

Independent Team, “Kiboko Squad Revealed,” The Independent, September 15, 2009
http://www.independent. co.ugindex.php/cover-story/cover-story/82-cover-story/1769-kiboko-squadrevealed, (accessed 6 June 2011).
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid.
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Tripp, 138.
103
Human Rights Watch, State of Pain: Torture in Uganda, 20
104
Independent Team, September 15, 2009.
105
Ibid.
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HRW State of Pain: Torture in Uganda, 21
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Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in
Uganda, (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative: New Delhi, Inida, 2006), 14.
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Presidential Guard Brigade
Black Mamba Squad
Joint Anti-Terrorism Task
Force
Rapid Response Unit
(successor to VCCU)
Chieftaincy of Military
Intelligence

Museveni Praetorian
Guard108
Anti-Terrorism
Group/Harass Opponents109
Fighting the Lord’s
Resistance Army
Crime Fighting/Political
Harassment112
Intelligence Gathering/114
Extrajudicial Killing115

2003
2005110
2002111
2007113

As an example of the behavior and utilization of these militias one of them, the
Kiboko squad, will be briefly discussed. While, the government does not ‘formally’
employ them, or any of the other informal security groups there is a little doubt among
Ugandans what is really taking place.116 These judgments are not based solely on a
distrust of Museveni or on unfounded conspiracies; rather, militia authorities often slip as
to where their groups receive support and for what causes. For example, one Kiboko
squad member told a foreign journalist that their infamous sticks used to break up
demonstrations and riots were kept in an underground room in the Central Kampala
108
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Gunrun Dewey, “A Reflection on Real Security for Uganda,” Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative
vol. 14 no 1 (Spring 2007).
110
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Uganda: Security Force Executions Exposed, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2003/10/02/uganda-securityforce-executions-reported (accessed 6 June 2011)
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Allan Tacca, “Can Kiboko Ruffians Save NRM From the Citizen,” Sunday Monitor July 4, 2010,
http://www.monitor.co.ug/OpEd/OpEdColumnists/AllanTacca/-/878694/951524/-/u6j07jz/-/index.html
(accessed 20 July 2010). A quick perusal of local papers demonstrates the citizen’s recognition of the
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Police Station.117 Another said that they were told not to beat up opposition authorities
but “small people”.118 Officially, the regime claims that the Kiboko militias, and others
like them, are only a “community who organized themselves in a self-defense group
against rioters.”119 However, one Kiboko member discounts Museveni’s statement about
the local nature of the militia. Following the Kiboko’s break-up of a demonstration at the
Clock Tower in Kampala this member said: “Everything has an owner. Uganda is owned
by President Museveni, so we shall fight to protect him in power.”120This disturbing
allegiance directly to the president represents the sentiments of many of these private
militias.
This militarization of Uganda has several negative impacts on Uganda. First, the
ability of the regime to create multiple ‘private’ militias to enforce its interests
throughout the country is problematic to social identities seeking to check runaway
political power. Second, the growing militarization of society is another example of the
way in which the Museveni government has sought to acquire systemic power in order to
pursue its interest. This movement to acquire systemic power via force signals to the rest
of society the political authorities’ desire to retrench their systemic power at all costs.
Lastly, an ethnic dimension surrounds these militaristic tendencies. The majority of these
militia groups originates from and operates within the southern half of the country. This
continues the trend of Uganda’s political authorities shaping military power from their
general ethnic region. Obote and Amin both did this and now Museveni is doing the
117
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Ibid.
119
Rodney Muhumuza, “Who Are the Face Behind Kiboko Squad,” Daily Monitor, June 26, 2010
http://www.monitor .co.ug/SpecialReports/-/688342/946414/-/fxlf89/-/index.html, (accessed 16 Aug 2010).
120
Ibid.
118

74

same. The lack of ethnic diversity within these groups is another sign of political
authorities’ intentions to hold onto systemic power by any means necessary. The general
exclusion of northern ethnic groups from this militarization of society strengthens the
government’s ethnic base, thus further dividing Ugandan society along ethnic lines.
Decreasing National Unity
Despite its attempts to achieve national unity through its broad based governance
approach, the government has failed to unify the country through the development of
political cohesion. The reasons for this have been argued above, but the conflicting
patronage system, repression and the unequal distribution of development gains have
dramatically hindered Museveni’s attempts at creating national unity. The clearest
evidence of this can be found in the election returns since the reintroduction of elections
in 1995.121 This reintroduction of elections was the result of both international pressure
and an internal government motivation for electoral legitimacy, which was critical in
moving forward and to staying in power for longer. The inability to manufacture national
unity has hindered the reconstruction of power within society. Furthermore, the hijacking
of electoral legitimacy has served to retrench political power, and the political authorities
who hold it, as the dominant power in Ugandan society.
During the first election in 1996 the NRM and Museveni won with a large
percentage of the national vote (see Table 12). While the election was a landslide in favor
of Museveni this election is largely believed to represent the will of the people
throughout the entire country. This election was the first sign of an emerging national
121

These elections are good evidence of this decreasing national unity as the major players have stayed
essentially the same in all elections. Because the major players have remained the same the ethnic
north/south divide becomes irrelevant in determining national unity.
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identity and consensus apart from ethnic division. Despite the presence of multiple
candidates in the first election under the NRM, all candidates were from the NRM and
failed to represent a viable difference to Museveni’s candidacy. The inclusion of only
NRM candidates for presidential office effectively allowed Museveni to run unopposed.
Nonetheless, the results of this election do show Museveni’s popularity and the potential
for leveraging that potential towards the creation of national unity.
Table 12. 1996 Presidential Election Results.122
Candidate
Votes Received
Yoweri Museveni
4,458,195
Paul Ssemogerere
1,416,140

Percentage
74.3
23.6

Six years later cracks began emerging in national support for the regime.
Following his fallout with Museveni, Dr. Kizza Besigye, broke with the NRM party line
and decided to run for the presidency against Musevni. Accusing Museveni and the
regime from deviating from a truly democratic environment Besigye garnered 27.7 % of
the vote in the 2001 elections (see Table 13). It is during this election that cracks in
nascent national unity began to percolate only to boil over during the 2006 elections.
Besigye’s candidacy represented the opportunity to demonstratively signal collective
frustrations to the government concerning corruption and general dismay. Following this
threat to its systemic power the regime moved to secure its power via patronage and
repression.
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Electoral Commission, Ugandan Presidential Elections 9 May 1996, Final Results (Kampala:
Government of Uganda) at http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/Nat_Res_1996.pdf (accessed 22 July 2011).
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Table 13. 2001 Presidential Election Results123
Candidate
Kizza Besigye
Yoweri Museveni

Votes Received
2,029,190
5,088,470

Percentage
27.7
69.4

Intimidation and violence towards Besigye and his colleagues marred the 2006
elections.124 The arrests and intimidation of Besigye illustrated the fear the government
felt that Besigye represented to the continuation of the Museveni tenure. As Table 14
shows Besigye garnered 37.39% of the vote to Museveni’s 59.26%. Museveni and the
regime had clearly begun to lose legitimacy among large sections of the country. While
the rise of a challenger candidate and opposition parties does not necessarily illustrate a
decrease in national unity they do illustrate the growing sense that the Museveni regime
was beginning to develop runaway political power. Furthermore, the polarizing rhetoric
of Museveni and his regime against Besigye, and the larger opposition that he represents,
is beginning to decrease the possibility of any sense of national unity or identity forming
under Museveni. This became dramatically clear during the 2011 election and its
aftermath.
Table 14. 2006 Presidential Election Results125
Candidate
Votes Received
Kizza Besigye
2,592,954
Yoweri Museveni
4,109,449

123

Percentage
37.39
59.26

Electoral Commission, Uganda Presidential Elections March 2001, Summary Results Sheet by District,
(Kampala: Government of Uganda) at http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/Dist_Sum_2001.pdf (accessed 22
July 2011).
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The 2011 election cycle in Uganda was highly contested. In the months leading
up to the election both Museveni and Besigye canvassed the country for support. Large
turnouts for Besigye revealed the growing discontent with the Museveni regime. It was
clear that the growing support of Besigye and coherence within the opposition movement
was a threat to the systemic power of political authorities. Table 15 reveals the election
results. Museveni won the election by the largest margin since the 1996 elections. This
was not a signal of increased support for the regime, but rather a more concerted effort a
vote rigging and buying.126 This concerted effort dramatically skewed the vote in
Museveni’s favor. While the exact level of skewing may never be known, the aftermath
of the elections clearly demonstrate a growing lack of national unity around Museveni.
Table 15. 2011 Presidential Election Results127
Candidate
Votes Received
Kizza Besigye
2,064,963
Yoweri Museveni
5,428,369

Percentage
26.01
68.38

Also, the regimes actions during the 2011 election season further demonstrated
the lengths to which the regime would go to maintain its own power in society. Several
months after the elections the Walk-to-Work protests began. As previously discussed
these protests began as demonstrations against high food and fuel prices; however
following the arrests of Besigye and other opposition leader the protests transformed into
anti-government riots. The riots lasted for several days on end before subsiding and
reigniting several days later. The regime has lost legitimacy with some parts of the
general population, but certain portions continue to support the regime. The lack of a
126
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truly competitive democracy in Uganda is causing national unity to decrease within the
country, with some worried openly about civil war during times of tension.128 The
presence of a growingly coherent political opposition does not itself portend national
disunity, but the regime’s reaction and that of its supporters does. What should be of
concern to those in society is the continued centralization of political power in Museveni.
The Institutionalization of Personal Rule
The final consequence and perhaps one of the most troubling consequences, yet
least quantifiable, of Musveni’s rule on Ugandan politics is the institutionalization of
personal rule. It is not just that Museveni is an archetypal charismatic leader, as per
Weber129, that is the main negative consequence, but rather it is the enacting of laws that
center large amounts of political power with the president via the ability to appoint many
key government positions throughout the country. For all of its corruption and human
rights abuses the Museveni regime has facilitated some positive changes in Uganda as a
result of their political foresight and action. That said, what happens when Museveni
chooses his successor and his foresight or political ability fall short? With institutional
power centered within the president the country could soon digress towards dictatorial
rule.
Several scholars have noted this trend beginning to take place in Ugandan society.
Andrew Mwenda argues that the personalization of power is taking place across several
arenas of government, but all centered on reshaping the constitutional powers of the
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president towards more personal rule.130 And Tripp argues that the reshaping of
constitutional powers, specifically the elimination of presidential term limits, was the
“quid quo pro of political liberalization”131 in Uganda politics. Furthermore, Tripp notes
that troubling practices in relation to the independence of parliament and the judiciary are
emerging.132 Michael Keating also argues that parliament is losing is effectiveness in the
face of the increasing personalized nature of presidential rule.133 This increased
centralization of power in Museveni leads to the repression of the opposition, which
serves to further entrench the status quo power relationships. Roger Tangri further details
this repression of political opposition to personal rule by noting the number of ministers
fired in the run-up to the 2004 constitutional changes.134 Lastly, as argued previously the
number of presidentially appointed cabinet positions have increased and this has served
to further entrench personal rule in Uganda.
As is illustrated in the previous paragraph numerous elements of personal rule are
emerging in Uganda and one of the most disturbing is the parliamentary independence.
The longer Museveni stays in power the more wedded to his personal rule the
composition of parliament becomes. The longer Museveni is in power the less likely the
party composition in parliament is going to change (Table 16). With this increased
likelihood of inertia against change MPs will continue to promote Museveni’s rule in
attempt to promote their own NRM credentials and inadvertently further entrench
130
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personal rule. Thus, the possibilities exist that if parliament continues in its current party
composition Ugandan democracy could erode as power is gradually shifted more and
more towards the president.
Table 16. Ugandan Parliamentary Composition by Party Since 2006.
Year
Total NRM Seats (% of total)
2006135

206 (69%)

2011136

279 (83%)

As argued the effect this institutionalization of personal rule could be devastating
for Ugandan society. Institutionalized personal rule can only survive so long as the
charismatic figurehead of the institution still exists. Once a power transition takes place
in Uganda the chances of political life spiraling out of control in Uganda are high. One
merely has to recall the erratic nature of the Amin years for an example of personalized
rule run amok. The lifting of presidential term limits and the continued possible
weakening of parliament137 likely portend a possible return to the chaos of the Amin
years. While the level of mass killing is not likely to happen again the level of personal
corruption and governmental collapse are strong possibilities once Museveni leaves
office.
Conclusion
From the evidence presented in this chapter and the previous one it is clear that Museveni
and other political authorities’ effects on society are mixed. Ultimately he achieved some
of his desired end results of stimulating economic and national development, but at what
135
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cost? There is little evidence that the north/south ethnic tensions have subsided as a result
of these positive effects and the negative consequences only serve to further entrench
these ethnic divisions. Furthermore, far from shifting power towards social identities
Museveni’s initiatives have further entrenched his own political power and
institutionalized personal rule. By further entrenching his own political power Museveni
has further entrenched the status quo power distribution in society. The longer Museveni
says in power the more likely it will be that power will only be redistributed away from
Museveni via revolutionary means.
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CONCLUSION:MUSEVENI’S ECONOMY OF AFFECTION
The preceding chapters modeled how societal power structures have shifted
under Museveni, the mechanisms of Museveni’s power maintenance and the
consequences of Museveni’s presidential tenure. The model outlined in chapter 2
describes how societal power has shifted during Museveni’s tenure, but it fails to capture
the full political logic of Museveni’s actions. This concluding chapter will attempt to
synthesize some of the arguments presented in chapters 1-3in order to fill in the gaps the
model presents in understanding Museveni’s motivations and political logic. This logic
illustrates that Museveni’s governed Uganda according to the underlying political
landscape of Ugandan society, namely the ethnically fractious nature of society. His
choice to govern in this manner has led to his declining favorability in Western circles.
These realities are central to developing a proper understanding of Museveni’s
centralization of power. This final section will briefly elaborate on the historical nature of
these realities and the role they play in shaping Ugandan politics.
Ugandan Political Realities
A distinct north-south ethno-linguistic divide and kinship loyalties underscore
Ugandan society. Each of these realities interconnects with the others to form a complex
political landscape outside of which the actions of political actors cannot be understood.
These realties are products of the distinct historical context of Uganda. While not wholly
unique to Uganda, these realities both constrain and facilitate Museveni’s actions during
his tenure.
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North-South Ethno-linguistic division
Uganda is ethnically divided along a north-south demarcation. This division is the
result of migration patterns beginning in the early fourteenth century. Around that time
the continental Bantu migration was underway, which migration brought Africans of
Bantu ethnicity to southern Uganda.138 The sedentary nature of these tribes facilitated and
enhanced their organizational opportunities.139 Tribal structures soon began to emerge
according to kinship linkages in specific localities and over time became highly
organized ethno-political kingdoms. Concurrently to this migration there was also a
migration from the region of present-day South Sudan.140 However, unlike the mainly
sedentary patterns of southerners, northern tribes were more diffuse after coming from
less sedentary living styles of their origin. Thus, northern tribes established more fluid
tribal structures than those in the south.
These two broad ethnicities were juxtaposed in a single state as part of the British
colonial empire. Favoring indirect colonial rule, the British used the more organized
southern Bantu tribes, principally the Buganda but others as well, to administer colonial
affairs and the northern tribes in providing security for the colony.141 Ugandan society
was constructed under this division of labor and this system continued until independence
in 1962. The historical legacies of this division of labor continue to be seen with most of
the professional class coming from southern Uganda and much of the military, until
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Museveni’s tenure, coming from the north. This informal class system permeates
Ugandan social thinking and interaction. It is difficult for parties from both halves to
interact constructively on many issues. This ethno-linguistic division has entrenched
kinship loyalty as a dominant political reality in society.
Kinship Loyalties
The strength of kinship loyalties derives from the ethno-linguistic distinctness of
Ugandan’s north-south division. The absence of a unifying state apparatus allowed
localized tribal structures to construct themselves around kinship linkages. British
colonial structures, to include British government paradigms, were then superimposed
upon these localized, informal structures.142Under the influence of colonial rule and postindependence mirroring of colonial political structures, formal institutions gradually
gained some level of societal legitimacy within prevailing informal institutions. Over
time a syncretic mixture of formal and informal institutions began to emerge.143 The
syncretic nature of the institutional structure has influenced, and continues to influence
Ugandan society today. An anecdote will illustrate how this syncretic system operates.144
No Cameras in the Market
While filming a documentary in 2005 Steve and his Ugandan friend Prosper were
shooting footage in the St. Balikudembe (Owino) Market. The purpose of this footage
was documentary in nature and apolitical. However the entourage of several Americans
with expensive looking camera equipment intrigued market security guards. These guards
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held formal positions within the local government security forces and were paid through
public funds; they represented the formal institutions and the legitimacy of these
institutions. With AK-47’s in tow the security guards confronted the film crew and
escorted them to offices above the market. Upon further discussion it was made clear that
filming in the marketplace was no longer going to be permitted. However, during the
conversation a distant kinship linkage emerged between Prosper and the lead security
guard. The situation was then diffused and Steve’s entourage was let go without any
further complications or questions. All parties in the filmcrew understood that the kinship
linkage allowed them to avoid complications. Thus, the underlying informal relationship
between Prosper and the guard overrode the formal enforcement
This anecdote is representative of the broader societal picture the model
developed in chapter 1 overlooks, but can be understood by a more hybrid model of
society. By simply modeling the structural power shifts that occurred, the model has a
tendency to underestimate the importance of underlying political realities. Now that these
two dominant political realities of Ugandan society have been briefly sketched one can
now understand why Museveni governed in the manner that he did.
The Affection of Patronage
Within the context of the Ugandan political realities outlined aboveone can begin
to understand Museveni’s political logic. As argued in chapter 2 Museveni has
constructed different patronage systems in the north and the south. Far from being mere
schizophrenia the differing mechanisms of distributive patronage underscore the
underlying ethno-political dynamics of Ugandan society. These underlying dynamics
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constrained Museveni’s ability to govern Uganda in a manner acceptable to Western
governments. In order to maintain stability and the territoriality of Uganda Museveni
needed support from both northern and southern ethnic populations.Hyden’s model of
“economies of affection145” further illuminates this political logic.
In short, Hyden’s ‘economies of affection’ model describes a number of the
informal institutions underlying African politics.Hyden argues that the core principles of
an economy of affection are: “(a) whom you know is more important than what you
know, (b) sharing personal wealth is more rewarding than investing in economic growth
and (c) a helping hand today generates returns tomorrow.”146 Hyden further argues that
this political economy is not established as a system of graft, but rather as a system of
“informal social support.”147This system of informal social support is interwoven with
and apart of kinship linkages. Hyden argues that these sentiments of duty are “socially
embedded in the sense that [they] presuppose personal interdependece.148Simply put
those to whom you have a kinship linkage desreve, if not require, your social support and
you theirs. The social responsibilities one has to kin are unavoidable and constrain
poltical action in Uganda. Recognizing and operating within these constraints has
allowed Museveni to extend his presidential tenure to the extent that he has.
The two most prominent features of Museveni’s patronage regime that have led to
his centralization and personalization of power (decentralization and the cabinet) can
more fully be understood as economies of affection. Museveni has used decentralization
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to purchase northern ethnic loyalty, thus reducing northern elite’s claims to clientelistic
support and cabinet positions to reward southern ethnic loyalty. Not only has Museveni
established himself as the provider of benefit in both cases, but has allowed those directly
receiving benefits to establish their own economies of affection. This establishment of
cascading economies of affection further entrenches Museveni’s centralization of power.
Both patronage mechanisms can be understood as distinct political choices and Hyden’s
model suggests several reasons why these distinct political choices were made.
The Affection of Decentralization
As argued above the ethno-linguistic divide between north and south underscores
Ugandan society. Most often individuals will self-identify with their broader ethnic group
above any other. This reality constrained Museveni’s political vision of national unity:
without the support from northerners no national unity could be established. However,
Museveni’s southern identity constrained his ability to garner support from northerners.
Hyden’s model would suggest that Museveni decentralization scheme was organized as
such to allow Museveni to establish himself as benefactor to the north at the expense of
already existing ethnic patron/client structures.
Establishing himself as benefactor to the north undercut political and traditional
leaders. Through the establishment of ever-smaller districts Museveni allowed new
political authorities to emerge that were loyal to him. Undercutting current regional
political authorities through the decentralization process has allowed Museveni to
purchase spaces of political loyalty in northern Uganda. Furthermore, these new
authorities, captured by Museveni, could then establish their own clientelistic network
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loyal to Museveni. Through this process Museveni has made it more important that
northerners recognize Museveni as the political patron, then local political or traditional
leaders. Furthermore, the process of rebuilding the conflict ravaged north will further
erode the standing of ethnic regional leaders as they have little monetary support to offer
individuals. Conversly, Museveni has the multitude of state resources to rebuild the
northern economy.This erosion will likely shift support away from these leaders and
towards Museveni once northern Ugandan begins to see the benefits of Museveni’s
economy of affection.
The Affection of the Cabinet
Hyden’s model further suggests that southern ethnic groups expected Museveni to
distribute powerful cabinet positions to them. One could even go so far to say that
Museveni was constrained by these ethnic affiliations to provide such positions and
failure to meet this obligation would not be seen as a viable option. Given Uganda’s
powerful ethnic relationships Museveni’s southern affiliations could not go unrewarded if
he was to accomplish his national vision. With many of his cohorts entering power with
him in 1986 it was an uncomplicated task for Museveni to distribute political positions to
these individuals. As his tenure progressed it became more ever more important to reward
loyalty.
As previously demonstrated Museveni’s cabinet size has dramatically increased
since his tenure began; this growth suggests Museveni’s growing need to reward loyalty
and establish himself as premier benefactor to the south. In expanding the size of his
cabinet Museveni not only purchased southern loyalty, but established a system whereby
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recipients of cabinet positions could establish their own economy of affection. There
would be no reason to fear coup attempts so long as this economy of affection continued
to grow. Hypothetically once Museveni’s patronage recipients established fulfilled their
own ethnic obligations their recipients would develop a loyalty to Museveni.
Through both of these patronage agendas Museveni personalized Ugandan
politics. The most interesting aspect of this personalization is that it has occurred through
the informalization of formal institutions (decentralization and the cabinet). This
informalization is a product of the realities of Ugandan society and has proceeded
according to a political logic. Constrained by ethnic division in the north Museveni
pursued a patronage strategy constructed to undermine local traditional and political
leaders. Further constrained by expectations of patronage in the south Museveni further
informalized power according to these expectations. His distribution of power cabinet
positions to southerners concretized Museveni’s position as the head of a series of
cascading patron-client relationships throughout southern Uganda.
Conclusion
The previous paragraphs have been an attempt to fill one major gap in the model
developed in chapter 1. Placing Museveni’s centralization of societal power within the
context of Hayden’s economies of affection model has given a more complete analysis of
the dynamics of societal power structures in Uganda. The conclusions of this thesis also
illuminate several avenues for further research into Ugandan society and politics, as well
as African politics in general. First, this thesis primarily dealt with the domestic societal
power structures of Uganda. It has said nothing of how these structures affect Uganda’s
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international political and economic relations. Understanding how patronage structures
affect Uganda’s integration into the international economy would be useful in
determining the full consequences of authoritarian patronage systems. Second,
Museveni’s dual patronage system has allowed political authorities to maintain their
political tenure for nearly three decades. More research should be conducted into the
extent that multiple, differing patronage schemes operate within African countries
experiencing similar governing tenures. Third, the informalization of formal political
institutions may lead to the collapse of institutional structures once Museveni leaves
office. Research into the possible processes of reformalization of institutions after their
informalization will develop possible policy implications for societies that experience
these types of political systems.
Given the realities of Ugandan politics the question remains as to why Western
states acclaimed Museveni (and the other new generation of African leaders) as
watersheds in African politics. From the standpoint argued in this thesis Western leaders
fundamentally misunderstood the realities of African politics. This fundamental
misunderstanding primarily stemmed from the apparent denial of kinship realties within
African politics. It is not so much that Museveni has fallen short of his acclaim; rather it
is more that this acclaim was too hastily given without an understanding of Ugandan
politics in specific, and African politics in general.
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